The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power by Fehr, Ernst et al.
UBS Center Working Paper Series
Working Paper No. 2, November 2012
The Lure of Authority: 
Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power
Ernst Fehr 
Holger Herz 
Tom Wilkening

About the UBS International Center of Economics in Society
The UBS International Center of Economics in Society is an associated 
institute of the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich. It aims 
to become a center for world-class research in economics that investigates the 
interdependencies between the economy and society and fosters knowledge 
transfer. To achieve this goal, the UBS Center will recruit top international 
researchers and nurture young academic talents who focus on economically 
and socially relevant topics. Their research will go beyond disciplinary bound-
aries and take into account business perspectives. The UBS Center will fur-
thermore establish a continuous dialogue between academia, business and 
society. This exchange will foster the transfer of new knowledge and will 
further encourage solutions to key economic questions of our time.

The Lure of Authority: 
Motivation and Incentive  
Effects of Power
Ernst Fehr University of Zurich 
and UBS International Center of 
Economics in Society
Holger Herz University of Zurich 
Tom Wilkening University of 
Melbourne
 Abstract
Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical 
knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limit-
ed. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an 
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tion is in their material interest – suggesting that authority has non-pecuniary 
consequences for utility. Authority also leads to over-provision of effort by the 
controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates under-provide effort 
despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motiva-
tional consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal del-
egation choices.
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I. Introduction
Authority and power play an important role in human societies. Influential schol-
ars from various social science disciplines — such as Marx (1867), Russell (1938),
Parsons (1963), Dahl (1957), and Weber (1978) — have contributed to our under-
standing of the origins, characteristics, and potential consequences of these forces.
Despite some notable early exceptions (Simon (1951); Zeuthen (1968); Harsanyi
(1978); Bowles and Gintis (1988)), the study of authority and power has not been
a major focus in economics. More recently, however, organizational economists
have taken interest in the incentive effects of decision rights by studying situations
where one party has the contractual right to make decisions that influence another
party’s payoffs and potential choices (Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore
(1990); Aghion and Tirole (1997); Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999); Dessein
(2002); Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2004)). The granting of decision rights can
mitigate inefficiencies by shielding the controlling party from potential holdup and
expropriation.
There is, however, very little empirical work in economics that examines the be-
havioral consequences of authority and power or their motivational origins. This
paper explores these forces using a laboratory experiment where we study how indi-
viduals manage and respond to authority in a hierarchical relationship. We propose
a new “authority-delegation game” based on a model developed in Aghion and Ti-
role (1997). A principal and an agent must select one of a large number of potential
projects for implementation. One party, initially the principal, has the right to
decide which project to implement. The other party, initially the agent, can only
make a project recommendation but lacks direct power to determine the project.
We follow Aghion and Tirole (1997) by defining authority as the right to determine
the project.
Payoffs to the principal and agent for implementing a project are unknown ex ante,
and both parties can provide effort which directly controls the probability with which
they will be informed about the value of each project. One of the projects is best for
the principal, while a different project is best for the agent. After the parties have
exerted effort, four states are possible: both parties are informed, only the principal
is informed, only the agent is informed, or neither party is informed. Before the
parties provide effort, the principal can delegate authority to the agent and become
the subordinate party. Delegation of authority means that the agent becomes the
controlling party and has the right to choose the project.
Both the controlling party (i.e. the party with the decision right) and the subordi-
nate party have pecuniary incentives to exert effort in this setup because both parties
earn only a low outside option in the absence of any information. The subordinate’s
incentives are lower, however, because if both parties are informed, the controlling
party may overrule the subordinate’s proposal and choose the project which is best
for him or her. Delegation therefore increases the agent’s effort because he can now
implement his preferred project in cases where he is informed. However, delegation
also reduces the principal’s control over project choice. When the principal’s return
from the agent’s preferred project is high, the cost of losing authority is small. A
rational principal who maximizes her expected payoff should thus delegate authority
in this case. When a principal’s return from the agent’s preferred project is low,
however, the cost of losing authority is high and a rational principal who maximizes
expected payoff should retain authority.
Our first main result is that the principals show a proclivity for retaining author-
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ity in situations in which they could improve their expected income by delegating
it, i.e. in situations in which their return from the agent’s preferred project is rel-
atively high. However, the principals only delegate in roughly 40 percent of these
cases. Pessimistic expectations about the agent’s effort in case of delegation cannot
explain this reluctance. On the contrary, the principals have quite reasonable beliefs
about the agent’s effort, meaning that it would be profitable to delegate in the clear
majority of cases based on these beliefs. Nevertheless, principals prefer retaining
authority.
These findings suggest that the principals might view authority not just as an
instrument that helps them increase their earnings, but that the allocation of decision
rights has non-pecuniary consequences that inhibit the delegation of authority.1 In
our experiment, the fact that the principals are willing to sacrifice some of their
earnings to keep authority suggests a preference for the decision right.
Why are the principals willing to forgo money in order to keep the decision right?
Our empirical data indicate that a disutility for being overruled appears to be an
important driver behind their reluctance to delegate. A principal is overruled if
(i) she delegates authority and (ii) both the principal and the agent are informed
about project values so that (iii) the agent can disregard the principal’s information
and choose his preferred project. Note that the principal’s pecuniary payoff from
the agent’s preferred project is the same regardless of whether the principal is in-
formed about the project values or not. Conditional on effort, an expected utility
maximizing principal who is the subordinate of an informed agent should thus be
indifferent between the case where she is informed and overruled by the agent and
the case where she remains uninformed. It follows that her behavior after being in-
formed, overruled, and receiving the payoff from the agent’s preferred project should
be identical to her behavior after being uninformed and receiving the same payoff.
If, however, a principal experiences a non-pecuniary disutility from being over-
ruled, her behavior after these two outcomes may differ: the principal may be less
willing to delegate in the next period if overruled. This is exactly what we find
in our data. Principals who are overruled are significantly less likely to delegate
in the next period relative to those who are uninformed, even if it is in their pe-
cuniary interest to delegate. Moreover, we observe significantly higher delegation
rates in a control treatment where delegation is profitable and the principal cannot
be overruled after delegation (because she always remains uninformed) relative to
a treatment in which the profitability of delegation is larger but the principal can
be overruled. Thus, a disutility from being overruled appears to be an important
non-pecuniary factor behind the reluctance to delegate.
Our second main finding is that the controlling party substantially over-provides
effort relative to the Nash equilibrium and relative to his or her best response to
the subordinate party’s anticipated effort. This over-provision is persistent, with
no convergence to the Nash Equilibrium over time. Being in the position of the
controlling party thus generates additional motivation for effort provision.
Our third main finding is that many subordinates substantially under-provide
effort relative to the Nash equilibrium. In fact, a substantial minority of the subor-
dinate parties (between 30 and 50 percent across various treatments) chooses a zero
effort level even though — due to the very small cost of low positive effort levels
1Psychologists have postulated a preference for power (Mulder (1975)) or a preference for agency, auton-
omy and self determination (Rotter (1966); deCharms (1968); Deci (1981)). To our knowledge, however, no
evidence yet exists that demonstrates a willingness to pay (i.e. a preference) for power, agency, or autonomy.
3— zero effort is almost never an optimal choice. This result suggests that the lack
of authority has a demotivating effect on a substantial minority of the subordinate
parties.
It turns out that many aspects of our data can be captured by the notion that
subjects want to avoid ex-post regret about their choices — a hypothesis that was
introduced by Loomes and Sugden (1982). Regret aversion is a form of reference
dependent utility and is based on the idea that subjects derive disutility from regret
that arises by comparing their actual ex-post outcomes with those the subject could
have had by choosing a different action.
A distaste for ex-post regret can explain our under-delegation result in the follow-
ing manner:2 the principals exert strictly less effort throughout the experiment as
a subordinate (i.e. after delegation) than they did as the controlling party. Thus,
a principal who delegates and is informed in the role of a subordinate would also
have been informed as the controlling party.3 As being overruled leads to a project
with a lower value to the principal, a principal who delegates and is informed and
overruled may regret her delegation choice ex post, because if she had kept her de-
cision right she could have chosen her preferred project. Anticipating such regret,
an individual may maintain control in order to mitigate the potential for regret.
Moreover, a principal who has delegated can minimize feelings of regret by mini-
mizing the probability of being informed, i.e., by choosing a zero effort. Thus, the
desire to avoid regret can explain both the propensity for under-delegation and the
low effort choices of the subordinates.4 Finally, regret may analogously generate the
over-provision of effort by the controlling parties if they experience regret when they
remain uninformed because the right to choose the project is of little value in this
case. We discuss the evidence in favor of regret aversion in more detail in section
IV.B, section IV.E, and Appendix A.
Our paper is related to the experimental literature on the consequences of dele-
gation on punishment choices (Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), Coffman (2011)).
While these papers study the assignment of punishment in response to the allocation
choices of either a principal or a delegate, our paper studies the willingness of the
principal to delegate and the willingness of a principal and an agent to invest effort in
response to the assignment of decision rights. Our results on effort provision is also
related to the literature on the hidden costs of control (Fehr and Rockenbach (2003),
Fehr and List (2004), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Charness et al. (2012)). While this
literature shows that the exercise of control reduces an individuals’ positive reci-
procity towards the principal, our paper shows that lack of control has demotivating
consequences on subordinates that induce them to act against their material self
interest.
We believe that our results have potentially important implications across many
2For further details see Appendix A where we apply a formal model of regret aversion to our experiment.
3Effort in the experiment is identical to the probability of becoming informed about the value of each
project. Each party’s effort is a number in the set {0, 5, ..., 100}; this effort is compared to a random number
equally distributed between 1 and 100. If the random number is below the effort of the party, the party was
informed about the value of all projects; if the random number is above the effort of the party, the party
remained uninformed. Thus, if the principal’s effort as a controlling party is higher than her effort as a
subordinate party, then being informed as a subordinate party implies that the principal also would have
been informed as a controlling party.
4Note that regret can affect not only principals, but also agents in the subordinate role. The agents’
efforts might be wasted even if they are informed, since in cases where the principal is also informed, the agent
will be overruled. In these cases, agents may regret positive effort levels ex post. Therefore, regret averse
agents in the subordinate role may reduce effort relative to an agent that maximizes his or her expected
earnings.
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domains. In relation to the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart (1986);
Hart and Moore (1990)), (re)allocating property rights across firms may be difficult
if decision rights have non-pecuniary consequences for utility because organization
members with decision rights may oppose their re-allocation, even if they would
benefit economically from it. The under-delegation of authority not only reduces
the principals’ earnings, but also causes the agent to lose money in some of our
treatments. Thus the distortion in the allocation of control rights can lead to or-
ganizational structures that reduce the value of the organization as a whole. The
identification of motivational obstacles to delegation adds an important component
to the theoretical work by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999), Sliwka (2001), and
Bester and Kra¨hmer (2008), which predicts limits to delegation in environments
with limited commitment, dynamic incentives, or limited liability.
A reluctance to delegate decision rights may also play a role in corporate finance,
in the political sphere, and in the design of optimal institutions for regulating rela-
tions between firms. Models of empire-building investment (Jensen (1986), Hart and
Moore (1995)), which have been used extensively in the literature to understand the
trade-offs between financial instruments may, in part, be founded on non-pecuniary
motives to retain authority. In view of incumbents’ advantages for re-election (Gel-
man and King (1990)), these motives also strengthen the case for term limits because
politicians may otherwise try to keep their political power positions beyond what
is good for the polity. In addition, they may provide a rationale for models in the
spirit of Niskanen (1971) which assume that bureaucrats seek to maximize their
discretionary budget.
The motivational consequences of authority for effort provision may be equally
important. The motivation enhancing effect for the controlling parties and the
detrimental effect on the motivation of a large minority of the subordinates suggest
that the incentive effects of authority are larger than the standard model predicts: a
reallocation of authority may cause a marked increase in effort by the new controlling
party and a large reduction in effort by the party previously in control. The note-
worthy gap between the controlling and the subordinate parties’ efforts also implies
that when contracts are incomplete, the efficiency losses due to authority are likely
to be higher than the standard model predicts. Furthermore, our finding that a lack
of authority only seems to demotivate a minority of people suggests that putting
the right people into positions that lack authority is important. The development
of tools for detecting this type of employees may thus be important in minimizing
the cost associated with the (re)allocation of authority.
Despite the systematic deviations from the predictions of the Aghion and Tirole
(1997) model, we believe that their model is very useful for the study of authority
because the main comparative static predictions of the model are nicely met and
the precise numerical predictions of the model enabled us to detect the motivational
forces we described above. The model is thus incomplete in terms of the underlying
motivational forces, but the (incomplete) model is remarkably robust in terms of the
comparative static predictions. It remains to be seen whether this robustness is a
general feature of the broader organizational economics literature where communi-
cation (Dessein (2002), Rantakari (2008)), monetary incentives (Athey and Roberts
(2001)), and dynamic learning (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2004)) are possible.
However, even if the robustness of the comparative static predictions of the Aghion
and Tirole model extends to the broader organizational economics literature, we
believe that this literature should take the behavioral forces observed in our paper
5into account because — as we show here — they may have important consequences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We present a simplified version
of the model of Aghion and Tirole (1997) in section II and derive its theoretical
predictions. Section III details our experimental design and hypotheses. Section
IV reports the main results of our experiment and is separated into three parts.
Section IV.A summarizes the data and provides an overview of the major results.
Section IV.B explores possible reasons why principals might choose to keep control
rights. The third part, consisting of sections IV.C-IV.E, examines the reasons for
the controlling parties’ over-provision of effort and why subordinate parties might
want to under-provide effort relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. Section
V concludes.
II. Theoretical Motivations
The basis of our experimental design is a model of authority developed in Aghion
and Tirole (1997). We consider a world in which a principal (she) and an agent (he)
are organized in a hierarchical structure and must decide to implement one or zero
projects out of a set of n ≥ 3 potential projects. With each project k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
there is an associated non-contractible gain of Pk for the principal and a private
benefit Ak for the agent. If no project is implemented, the profit and private value
are both equal to a known outside value of P0 and A0 respectively.
For ease of exposition, we index the principal’s preferred project by 1 and the
agent’s preferred project by 2. The principal’s preferred project yields known profit
P1 to the principal and A1 to the agent where P1 > P0 and A1 > A0. Likewise,
the agent’s preferred project yields known benefit P2 to the principal and A2 to the
agent with A2 > A0 and P2 > P0. As their name suggests, the principal’s preferred
project yields a strictly higher value to the principal than the agent’s preferred
project (P1 > P2). Likewise, the agent’s preferred project yields strictly higher
value to the agent than the principal’s preferred project (A2 > A1).
While the potential values of projects are known, all projects look identical ex
ante and information must be collected in order to differentiate between them. The
principal and agent acquire information in a binary form. At private cost gA(e), the
agent learns his payoffs to all candidate projects with probability e. With proba-
bility 1− e, the agent learns nothing and cannot differentiate between the projects.
Similarly, at private cost gP (E), the principal becomes perfectly informed about the
payoffs of all projects with probability E and learns nothing with probability 1−E.
Effort choices are made simultaneously and privately. We concentrate on the case
where gA(e) and gP (E) are quadratic, g
′
A(0) = g
′
P (0) = 0, P1 − g
′
P (1) < 0, and
A2 − g′A(1) < 0. These assumptions ensure that the reaction functions are linear
and that a unique interior solution exists for both authority allocations.5
We consider a four stage game which relates decision rights, incentive conflict, and
effort. In the first stage, the principal decides whether to keep decision rights or to
delegate them to the agent. In the second stage, both parties privately and simul-
taneously gather information about the n projects’ payoffs. In the third stage, the
subordinate recommends a project to the controlling party. Finally, the controlling
party implements a project or the outside option on the basis of his information and
the information communicated by the subordinate.
5In the experiment, we also use a discrete effort space to reduce cognitive burden. All predictions in
section III.B are relative to the restricted effort space.
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We assume that the principal and agent are risk neutral. For a given effort level
and implemented project k, the principal’s utility is Pk− gP (E). The agent’s utility
is Ak − gA(e). As outcomes and effort choices are non-contractible, performance
or outcome-contingent payments are ruled out and the introduction of wages is
necessary only to satisfy the agent’s participation constraint, which, to avoid further
notation, we assume to be satisfied.
Information in the model is soft so that information passed between parties cannot
be verified. As such, if one party is informed and the other party is uninformed,
the informed party can limit the amount of information given to the other party.
As there is always an incentive conflict between the parties and outcomes are non-
contractible, there is always an incentive to restrict information to the preferred
project of the informed individual. It follows that communication between parties
is reduced to a recommendation for a single project choice.
A. Analysis and Theoretical Implications
We denote the party that has authority as the controlling party while the party
without authority is called the subordinate. For each party, the expected value for
selecting a project at random is less than their respective outside option. Thus,
under the assumption of risk neutrality or risk aversion, the subordinate prefers
to recommend the outside option rather than a random project. Similarly, an un-
informed controlling party never chooses unilaterally to undertake a project other
than the outside option.
Given that A2 > A1 > A0, P1 > P2 > P0, and information is soft, the subordinate
always has an incentive to recommend his or her preferred project to the controlling
party. The controlling party has an incentive to follow this recommendation if
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informed. It follows that if the principal keeps control, the utilities of a risk-neutral
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EVA = EAˆ1 + (1− E)eAˆ2 +A0 − gA(e),(2)
where
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Aˆi = Ai −A0, for i ∈ {1, 2}.(4)
If the agent receives control, the utility of the principal and agent are
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EV dA = (1− e)EAˆ1 + eAˆ2 +A0 − gA(e),(6)
where the superscript d denotes the expected payoffs in the delegation case.
From Equations 1 and 2, the reaction functions if the principal keeps control are
the solutions to the following first order conditions:
Pˆ1 − ePˆ2 = g′P (E),(7)
(1− E)Aˆ2 = g′A(e).(8)
7Equation 7 describes the principal’s reaction function which we denote by rP (e).
Equation 8 describes the agent’s reaction function denoted by rA(E). Note that both
rP (e) and rA(E) are downward sloping in (E, e)-space, implying that the principal’s
and agent’s effort level are strategic substitutes. Thus, an increase in the agent’s
effort induces the principal to reduce her effort and vice versa. By the additional
assumptions placed on gP (E) and gA(e) above, the reaction functions are also linear
and there exists an interior intersection of reaction functions, (eNE , ENE), which
constitutes the Nash equilibrium of this subgame.
If the agent receives control, the reaction curves of the principal and agent are the
solutions to:
(1− e)Pˆ1 = g′P (E),(9)
Aˆ2 − EAˆ1 = g′A(e),(10)
and denoted by rdP (e
d) and rdA(E
d). As in the case when the principal keeps control,
the reaction functions are downward sloping in (Ed, ed) space. Our uniqueness cri-
teria assumed above again ensure the existence of an interior intersection of reaction
functions, (ed
NE
, Ed
NE
), which constitutes the Nash equilibrium of this subgame.
A careful examination of the reaction functions if the principal keeps control and if
the agent receives control reveals that the principal decreases her effort when giving
up control while the agent increases his effort. Delegation thus has two effects on the
principal’s payoff: 1) a cost saving effect since delegation reduces the equilibrium
effort of the principal and increases the agent’s equilibrium effort, and 2) a project
selection effect which decreases the probability that the principal’s preferred project
is undertaken. As these effects are, in general, of opposite sign, the overall incentive
for delegation depends on the specifics of the cost function and the degree of interest
alignment. In our experiment, we chose cost functions and parameters such that
the magnitude of Pˆ2 determines whether delegation or retention is optimal for the
principal. Full details of the experimental design and its parameterizations are
discussed in more detail in the next section.
III. The Experiment
A. The Authority Game
At the center of our experimental design is a computerized authority-delegation
game with the following features. In each of ten periods, a principal is matched with
an agent and shown a set of 36 cards on her computer screen representing potential
projects.6 One of these cards has a small positive payoff for both players and is
placed face up representing the outside option. The remaining thirty five cards are
shuﬄed face down so that the location of each project is unknown. One of these
cards is red and represents the principal’s preferred project. Following the theory
section, we refer to this card as project 1. A second card is blue and represents
the agent’s preferred project. We refer to this card as project 2. The remaining
thirty-three cards are white and result in zero payoff for both parties. The task of
each principal-agent pair is to select a card which will be used for payment. The
payoffs ensure that individuals prefer to implement the outside option relative to
picking a card at random.
6Subjects are randomly assigned the role of a principal or of an agent and remain in this role throughout
the experiment. In the instructions, they were referred to as participant A and participant B.
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Play of the game is done in six stages which are illustrated in Figure 1 and dis-
cussed here. Initially principals are given the decision right which corresponds to
being able to select a card at the end of the game. In the first stage of the game,
each principal is asked whether he wishes to keep this right or to transfer the right
to the agent. Giving the right to the agent is binding and irreversible.
In the second stage, subjects choose their effort levels simultaneously and in pri-
vate.7 Both subjects select their effort in increments of 5 from {0, 5, . . . , 95, 100}.
This effort corresponds to the probability that the subject learns the location of all
projects. Effort has an associated cost generated via a quadratic cost function which
is constant across treatments and player types:
(11) gP (E) = 25
(
E
100
)2
, gA(e) = 25
(
e
100
)2
.
Subjects are presented information on the cost of effort in a table where each possible
effort and its associated cost is displayed. In all but one session, agents’ effort levels
are recorded via the strategy method where an effort level is elicited both for the case
where principals keep decision rights and the case where these rights are delegated.8
Thus, agents choose their effort levels before they know whether the principal has
delegated authority to them.
In the third stage, we elicit beliefs of both subjects. Principals and agents are
asked their beliefs about the effort of the other party both in the case where decision
rights are kept and where they are delegated. For principals this is done in two steps.
Beliefs are first elicited for the chosen authority assignment followed by beliefs for
the counterfactual. For agents, beliefs for both potential authority assignments are
elicited simultaneously. To prevent hedging, no incentives are used in the elicitation
of beliefs. In the fourth stage, agents are informed about whether principals kept
or transferred decision rights. Then, given a subject’s effort for the principal’s
assignment of authority, a random process determines whether that subject learns
the payoffs of all projects or whether he stays uninformed. The effort of the other
subject is not revealed nor is information indicating the success or failure of the
other subject’s effort. All information gained at this stage is private.
In the fifth stage, the subordinate is given the ability to recommend a project to
the controlling party. This is accomplished by visibly marking a single project on
the computer screen, which can include the outside option. The recommendation
is shown to the controlling party, but the payoffs associated with the recommended
project are kept hidden in the case where the controlling party remains uninformed.
In the final stage, after seeing the recommendation of the subordinate and the
information from his own effort, the controlling party selects a project. Payment for
the round is based on the selected project and the costs of effort of each subject.
7In the experiment we refer to effort as “search intensity”.
8We test whether the strategy method influences our results by comparing the results of three sessions
of the HIGH treatment where the strategy method was run (N = 70) to the session of the HIGH treatment
where a standard elicitation method was used (N = 30). We find no difference across treatments. P-
Values of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which tests whether the distribution of agent effort is identical in
treatments with and without strategy method, are 0.79 for effort with decision rights and 0.81 for effort
without decision rights. Delegation frequencies differ by 1.6 percent. This difference is also not significant
(p=0.71 in a Fisher’s exact test). The data from the treatments using the strategy method are therefore
pooled with the data from treatments using the standard elicitation method in the subsequent analysis.
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Figure 1: Experimental procedures in the authority game
B. Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experimental design involves four treatments implemented in a between-
subjects design. Treatments vary in the amount that principals and agents are
paid for the selection of the project preferred by the other party (P2 and A1). By
changing the payoff given to the other party, the level of incentive conflict in the
environment is changed, which, as indicated by the first order conditions in section
II.A, leads to differences in predicted delegation and effort levels.
Table 1 summarizes the value of projects across the four treatments. In each
treatment, each party earns 40 points for the selection of their preferred project and
a smaller amount for the other party’s preferred project. Treatments are divided
into two groups — symmetric and asymmetric — where symmetry refers to the
relative values of P2 and A1. In the symmetric treatments (LOW and HIGH) the
payoffs from the other party’s preferred project are the same for the principal and
agent. In the low alignment treatment (LOW), the payoffs from the other party’s
preferred project are small (20) leading to a high degree of incentive conflict. In
the high alignment treatment (HIGH), the payoffs from the other party’s preferred
project are large (35) leading to less incentive conflict. In the asymmetric treatments
(PLOW and PHIGH), the payoffs from the other party’s preferred project are large
for one of the two parties (35) and small for the other (20). As a naming convention,
we use PHIGH to denote the case where the principal’s value is high under the agent’s
preferred project. The PLOW treatment is the case where the principal’s value is
low under the agent’s preferred project.
Table 1: Overview of Project Payoffs
Project 1 Project 2 Outside Other
Principal Agent Principal Agent Option Projects
PLOW 40 35 20 40 10 0
LOW 40 20 20 40 10 0
HIGH 40 35 35 40 10 0
PHIGH 40 20 35 40 10 0
9St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 Stage 6age age age age age
Delegation
i i
Effort 
i i
Beliefs
(S )
Project Valuations
Determined/Not
Principal
Dec s on Dec s on trategy Determined
Signal of
Formal
Choice of 
Agent
Effort 
D i i Beliefs
Delegation
Revealed
Subordinate Controlling
Party
ec s on
(Strategy) (Strategy) Project Valuations
Determined/Not
Determined
Figure 1: Experimental procedures in the authority game
B. Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experimental design involves four treatments implemented in a between-
subjects design. Treatments vary in the amount that principals and agents are
paid for the selection of the project preferred by the other party (P2 and A1). By
changing the payoff given to the other party, the level of incentive conflict in the
environment is changed, which, as indicated by the first order conditions in section
II.A, leads to differences in predicted delegation and effort levels.
Table 1 summarizes the value of projects across the four treatments. In each
treatment, each party earns 40 points for the selection of their preferred project and
a smaller amount for the other party’s preferred project. Treatments are divided
into two groups — symmetric and asymmetric — where symmetry refers to the
relative values of P2 and A1. In the symmetric treatments (LOW and HIGH) the
payoffs from the other party’s preferred project are the same for the principal and
agent. In the low alignment treatment (LOW), the payoffs from the other party’s
preferred project are small (20) leading to a high degree of incentive conflict. In
the high alignment treatment (HIGH), the payoffs from the other party’s preferred
project are large (35) leading to less incentive conflict. In the asymmetric treatments
(PLOW and PHIGH), the payoffs from the other party’s preferred project are large
for one of the two parties (35) and small for the other (20). As a naming convention,
we use PHIGH to denote the case where the principal’s value is high under the agent’s
preferred project. The PLOW treatment is the case where the principal’s value is
low under the agent’s preferred project.
Table 1: Overview of Project Payoffs
Project 1 Project 2 Outside Other
Principal Agent Principal Agent Option Projects
PLOW 40 35 20 40 10 0
LOW 40 20 20 40 10 0
HIGH 40 35 35 40 10 0
PHIGH 40 20 35 40 10 0
10
Table 2 shows the predicted Nash equilibrium effort levels and expected profits
for each treatment under the case where authority is kept and transferred. As in
the model developed in Section II, E represents the effort level of the principal
while e represents the effort level of the agent. As can be seen in table 2, the LOW
treatment has a high degree of incentive conflict and authority should be kept by the
principal, because the principals expected profit if she keeps control, EVP , is 20.1
while the expected payoff if she delegates control, EV dP , is only 17.3. In the HIGH
treatment, incentive conflict is reduced and the principal should delegate authority
(EVP = 23.3 vs. EV
d
P = 24.0).
9
Table 2: Predicted effort levels and expected profits
Principal has control Agent has control Dele-
ENE eNE EVP EVA E
dNE ed
NE
EV dP EV
d
A gation?
PLOW 55 25 20.1 25.6 35 45 17.2 23.3 No
LOW 55 25 20.1 17.3 25 55 17.3 20.1 No
HIGH 45 35 23.3 24.0 35 45 24.0 23.3 Yes
PHIGH 45 35 23.3 17.2 25 55 25.6 20.1 Yes
ENE and Ed
NE
denote Nash equilibrium predictions for the principal depending on the control allocation.
eNE and ed
NE
denote Nash equilibrium predictions for the agent depending on the control allocation. EVP ,
and EV dP denote expected equilibrium profits for the principal depending on the control allocation. EVA
and EV dA denote expected equilibrium profits for the agent depending on the control allocation.
In the asymmetric treatments the rewards to delegation are either exacerbated or
further diminished relative to the symmetric treatments. Of the four treatments,
principals are predicted to have the highest expected value from delegation in the
PHIGH treatment (EV dP = 25.6) and the lowest expected value from delegation in
the PLOW treatment (EV dP = 17.2).
In addition to the delegation predictions, the different interest alignments also lead
to different predictions with regard to equilibrium effort levels. All point predictions
are given in Table 2. Note that the delegation decisions predicted by the Nash equi-
librium are always in the set of welfare maximizing delegation choices. In the PLOW
treatment, aggregate expected earnings EVp+EVA are highest if the principal keeps
authority, while in the PHIGH treatment aggregate expected earnings are highest
if the principal delegates authority. In the symmetric treatments, LOW and HIGH,
the delegation decision has no effect on the overall welfare if subjects choose Nash
equilibrium effort levels.
In the experiment described above, the delegation decision of the principal and
the joint effort decisions of the principal and agent generate one of many potential
compound lotteries. If an individual’s preferences are reference dependent (as, e.g.,
stipulated in regret theory), the individual’s preferred action profile may depart from
the equilibrium action profile which assumes players are expected value maximizers.
In order to control for such heterogeneity in preferences, we ran a lottery task and
used choices from this lottery task as a proxy for the degree to which a subject’s
preferences exhibit reference dependence. In the lottery task, each subject is pre-
9As will be shown below, while the difference in theoretical expected value is small, the empirical difference
turns out to be large.
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sented with the opportunity to participate in six different lotteries, each having the
following form:
Win CHF 6 with probability 12 , lose CHF X with probability
1
2 . If subjects reject
the lottery they receive CHF 0.
The six lotteries varied in the amount X, that could be lost, where X took on
the values X ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. One of the six gambles was randomly selected and
paid. As these lotteries are binary, any reference dependent utility function with a
reference point between the lowest and the highest outcome can lead to a rejection of
gambles with X ≤ 6. In particular, individuals who are regret averse and compare
their outcome to the action which is optimal ex post will reject actuarially fair
gambles. Thus, the amount X at which a subject starts rejecting the lottery can
therefore be taken as an indicator of the degree to which a subject’s preference
exhibits reference dependence, such as, e.g., regret aversion. For example, a subject
that rejects all lotteries with a potential loss of X > 3 is classified as exhibiting more
regret aversion than a subject that only rejects all lotteries with a potential loss of
X > 5.10
In principle, the rejection of actuarially fair gambles in the lottery choice task
may also reflect a subject’s loss or risk aversion. However, in Section IV.E and the
appendices D and E we show that loss and risk aversion have little explanatory
power with regard to effort choices while regret aversion can rationalize both the
controlling parties’ over-provision of effort and the preference for extremely low (i.e.
zero) effort levels among the subordinates.11
Thus, if regret aversion is a motive behind subjects’ rejection of lotteries in the
lottery task then the propensity to reject lotteries should also be a predictor of
subjects’ effort level as a controlling party and the tendency to provide zero effort
as a subordinate party. Likewise, if regret aversion is a motive behind both the
propensity to reject lotteries and the reluctance to delegate then we should observe
a correlation between the two phenomena. The lottery task may thus provide further
evidence regarding the motivational forces behind effort and delegation choices.
C. Procedures
Typically, between 20 and 30 subjects participated in each experimental session
which consisted of three parts.12 In part one, subjects played 7 periods of a single
player version of the authority game. This single player game is identical to the
authority game except that there is no second party. Subjects choose an effort and
receive information probabilistically based on their effort. Each individual must then
select a project based solely on his own information. The selected project does not
affect the payoff of a second party nor does a second party recommend a project.
This single player variant gives subjects a chance to get familiar with the effort cost
schedule and the computer program.
10143 out of 150 subjects who participated in the lottery task and played the authority-delegation game
in one of our main treatments have a unique switching point. We use the accepted gamble with the largest
potential loss as the independent variable when using the lottery task and do not exclude subjects in the
analysis. Excluding subjects with multiple switching points does not significantly alter any of our results.
11Moreover, it has been shown by Rabin (2000) that the rejection of lotteries for X ≤ 6 cannot be
reconciled with the assumption that utility is a (reference-independent) strictly concave function of total
wealth. Risk aversion based on concave utility of wealth at such low stake levels would imply unreasonable
levels of risk aversion at higher stakes, which makes risk averse behavior in this task incompatible with
expected utility theory.
12More details on individual sessions is provided in Appendix B.
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In part two, the subjects are divided into matching groups of 10 subjects consisting
of 5 principals and 5 agents. Subjects play 10 periods of the main authority game in
one of the four treatments. Subjects are informed that in a new period they would
be matched with another randomly chosen partner.
In part three, subjects are asked to take a short questionnaire in which demo-
graphic information is recorded. Instructions for the experiment include a control
quiz and a verbal summary of the authority game.
Our subject pool consisted primarily of students at Zurich University and the
Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.13 The first series of experiments took
place in May and June 2007 with a second series of experiments conducted in May
and October 2008. Further control experiments were conducted in May 2009 and
April 2011.14 In total, 504 subjects participated in the experiment, divided into
17 sessions. Experiments were computerized using the software z-tree (Fischbacher
(2007)). Payment was given for each period of the main authority game, for the last
five periods of the single player game, and for one randomly chosen gamble from the
lottery task. On average, an experimental session of the main treatments lasted 1
hour with an average payment of 33.5 CHF ($35.00).15
IV. Experimental Results
A. The Main Facts
Our experimental design generates predictions with regard to delegation, effort
and project choices. With regard to project choices and project recommendations
the theory does very well:
RESULT 1: Controlling parties who are informed about the project valuations al-
most always choose their preferred projects, implying that they overrule the subor-
dinates’ recommendations. Informed subordinates almost always recommend their
preferred project and uninformed controlling parties almost always implement this
recommendation.
Result 1 is supported by the following numbers. Principals (Agents) in the role
of controlling parties who were informed implemented their preferred project in
100 percent (97.3 percent) of the cases. Principals (agents) in the role of the in-
formed subordinate party recommended their preferred project in 92.6 percent (92.5
percent) of the cases. Finally, principals (agents) in the role of the uninformed con-
trolling party followed the subordinate party’s recommendation in 94.1 percent (96.5
percent) of the cases. If the subordinate parties were not informed they typically
recommended the outside option (principals: 95.3 percent; agents: 97.0 percent)
Result 1 indicates that the controlling parties used the decision right in their
favor. As predicted by theory, this generates a disincentive for subordinates’ effort
provision but it also makes it reasonable for the principals to delegate authority if
their payoff loss at the agents’ preferred project is low. Therefore, we next turn to the
principals’ delegation choices. Recall that in case of Nash equilibrium effort choices
by the principal and agent, the principal has an incentive to delegate authority in
13Subjects were drawn from a database of volunteers using ORSEE (Greiner (2004)).
14See also Appendix B.
15The 25 and 50 period control treatments took longer. Additional information on these treatments is
given in section IV.B.
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the HIGH and PHIGH treatments and to keep authority in the LOW and PLOW
treatments. Empirically, we find in our experiment:
RESULT 2: (a) When the principals’ interests are misaligned with the agent (LOW
and PLOW) such that the principals are predicted to keep authority, delegation de-
cisions are close to the equilibrium predictions. (b) When the principals’ interests
are strongly aligned with the agent (HIGH and PHIGH treatments) such that princi-
pals should delegate, we observe strong under-delegation of authority relative to the
equilibrium predictions.
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Figure 2: Delegation frequencies by alignment
Figure 2 shows the frequency of delegation for each treatment graphically. As
can be seen on the left hand side of the figure, delegation rates in the PLOW
and LOW treatments are 16.3 percent and 13.9 percent. While these levels are
above the predicted level of zero, deviations from the prediction appear to be due to
infrequent experimentation rather than heterogeneity in delegation strategies. There
is little persistence in the strategy of delegation, with 67.4 percent of individuals
who delegated authority in one period switching to keeping authority in the next.
The frequency of delegation for most individuals is also low, with 39.4 percent of
individuals choosing to never delegate and 89.4 percent of individuals delegating in
three periods or less.
Average delegation rates in the HIGH and PHIGH treatment are 35.5 percent
and 42.7 percent, far below the predicted rate of 100 percent. These low delegation
rates are also rather stable over time. In the HIGH treatment the overall delegation
rate is 33.5 percent in the first five periods and 37.5 percent in periods 6-10. In the
PHIGH treatment the overall delegation rate is 36.7 percent in the first five periods
and stabilizes around 48.7 percent from period 6 onwards.16
16While the difference in delegation rates between the first and second half of the experiment is insignificant
for the HIGH treatment, the difference of 12 percentage points in the PHIGH treatment is significant
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three periods or less.
Average delegation rates in the HIGH and PHIGH treatment are 35.5 percent
and 42.7 percent, far below the predicted rate of 100 percent. These low delegation
rates are also rather stable over time. In the HIGH treatment the overall delegation
rate is 33.5 percent in the first five periods and 37.5 percent in periods 6-10. In the
PHIGH treatment the overall delegation rate is 36.7 percent in the first five periods
and stabilizes around 48.7 percent from period 6 onwards.16
16While the difference in delegation rates between the first and second half of the experiment is insignificant
for the HIGH treatment, the difference of 12 percentage points in the PHIGH treatment is significant
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In contrast to the LOW and PLOW treatments, the under-delegation of authority
in the HIGH and PHIGH treatments appears to be due to heterogeneity in delegation
strategies across individuals. Less than 20 percent of individuals delegate eight or
more times in the experiment, and individuals who delegate in one period are more
likely to delegate in the next period suggesting some persistence in the delegation
strategy. However, even in the PHIGH treatment in which delegation incentives are
highest according to the Nash prediction, 40 percent of individuals have a delegation
frequency of zero suggesting that under-delegation is rather pervasive.
One possible reason for the observed under-delegation might be that actual effort
provision if the principal keeps control compared to the case in which the agent
receives control makes it more profitable to keep authority. Table 3, which shows
the realized profits of principals who kept and delegated authority, shows that this
is not the case. In the HIGH and PHIGH treatments, realized profits for the prin-
cipal are lower than predicted if she keeps control and higher than predicted if the
agent receives control. Principals who delegate have on average 30.4 percent greater
earnings in the HIGH treatment and 44.5 percent greater earnings in the PHIGH
treatment.
Table 3: Realized profits and predicted equilibrium profits for principals
Principal has control Obser- Agent has control Obser-
Actual Predicted vations Actual Predicted vations
PLOW 18.3 * 20.1 251 17.6 17.2 49
LOW 19.0 20.1 310 15.0 ** 17.3 50
HIGH 19.1 *** 23.3 316 24.9 24.0 174
PHIGH 18.4 *** 23.3 172 26.6 25.6 128
Significance levels calculated by regressing earnings on a constant and testing whether the constant is equal
to the prediction. Errors clustered at the individual level. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, *
p < .1.
The second main hypothesis of the experiment is about effort provision. In theory,
an incentive conflict leads the controlling party to put in more effort than would be
optimal in the case of contractible effort and causes the subordinate to put in less.
Relative to this Nash equilibrium benchmark, we observe:
RESULT 3: Controlling parties provide an excess of effort relative to the Nash
equilibrium. Subordinates under-provide effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 3 plots the average deviation of effort levels from the predicted equilibrium
values by the principal and agent with both means and 95 percent confidence inter-
vals calculated from individual average efforts. It can be seen that, when authority
is kept, the principal over-provides and the agent under-provides relative to the
prediction. This phenomenon is reversed, again in all treatments, when authority
is delegated, and these deviations are significant for the majority of treatments.17
In the low treatment, for example, the principal over-provides effort by roughly 10
(p < 0.01 in a probit regression of delegation on a dummy for periods 6-10). We also ran a 50 period
session to test for potential long-run learning effects. While delegation increased over the first 20 periods,
under-delegation was still pervasive. See section IV.B for details.
17We report results from a non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test in Table C-1 of Appendix C.
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units relative to the prediction if she keeps control while the agent under-provides
effort by about 10 units. This deviation pattern is reversed when the agent is the
controlling party.
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Figure 3: Deviations from equilibrium effort predictions. The vertical axis shows the difference (E˜) between
the principal’s observed effort (E) and the Nash Equilibrium effort (ENE). The horizontal axis shows the
difference (e˜) between the agent’s observed effort (e) and the Nash Equilibrium effort (eNE).
The deviations in effort levels from the equilibrium prediction cause inefficiencies
that are reflected in the low actual payoff levels of the principals and the agents
relative to the predicted payoff levels. Table 3 shows that the principals earn less
than predicted in 5 out of 8 cases. In particular, if control is kept, which occurs most
frequently in all treatments, the principals always earn less than predicted. For the
agents the income loss relative to the prediction is even more extreme (see Table 4):
In all 8 cases they earn on average less than predicted.
The combined effect of under-delegation and deviations in effort provision has
particularly strong pecuniary consequences in the PHIGH treatment. Unlike the
other treatments, delegation in this treatment leads both the principal and agent
to be better off in expectations relative to held control. Principals who delegate
receive 45 percent more income compared to those who hold on to decision rights.
Likewise agents who are left as the subordinate receive 13.8 percent less profit than
those who are delegated to. Taken together, in PHIGH the welfare loss of keeping
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Table 4: Realized profits and predicted equilibrium profits for agents
Principal has control Obser- Agent has control Obser-
Actual Predicted vations Actual Predicted vations
PLOW 23.0 *** 25.6 251 18.8 ** 23.3 49
LOW 16.1 ** 17.3 310 17.9 20.1 50
HIGH 21.0 *** 24.0 316 20.1 *** 23.3 174
PHIGH 15.9 ** 17.2 172 18.1 ** 20.1 128
Significance levels calculated by regressing earnings on a constant and testing whether the constant is equal
to the prediction. Errors clustered at the individual level. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, *
p < .1.
authority amounts to 30 percent in terms of expected income.18 The loss in aggregate
payoff due to the deviations from the Nash equilibrium are not restricted to PHIGH,
however. Table C-2 in Appendix C shows that both the principals and the agents
earn less than in the Nash equilibrium in each of the 4 treatments. We summarize
these findings in the following result:
RESULT 4: In each treatment, the deviation in effort provision and delegation leads
to monetary losses for both parties relative to the Nash equilibrium. Monetary losses
are most acute in the PHIGH treatment where delegation would lead to higher average
earnings for both parties.
B. Exploring the principals’ reluctance to delegate
Pecuniary Motivations
A natural initial hypothesis for the observed under-delegation of authority in the
HIGH and PHIGH treatments is that individuals believe that they are monetarily
better off retaining authority. To see whether this hypothesis has merit, we consider
the following counterfactual: Suppose that a principal who did not delegate would
elect to delegate instead. Given her beliefs about the agent’s actions if she keeps
control and if she delegates control, what would be her gain or loss in expected
earnings?
As the effort of the principal was elicited only in the case of her chosen authority
allocation a comparison of the principal’s expected earnings for the cases of delega-
tion and non-delegation requires assumptions about her effort in the counterfactual
authority allocation. As we have the principals’ beliefs about the agents’ effort from
both the delegation case and non-delegation case, a natural approach is to use the
principal’s best reply effort as a proxy for effort. If, for example, the principal kept
authority we can compute the principal’s best reply effort for the case in which the
principal had delegated authority. Using this effort proxy and the principal’s belief
about the agent’s effort enables us to compute the principal’s expected profit for the
counterfactual case of delegation.19
18The implicit assumption in this calculation is that if the principals who kept control rights were to
delegate instead, they would exert effort similar to those who delegated. If the principal were to exert less
effort, the overall monetary loss would be slightly smaller. In the extreme case where we assume principals
exert zero effort in the counterfactual, the monetary loss would amount to 27 percent.
19Under the assumption that the principal best replies to his beliefs the expected earnings for the coun-
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As a comparison value, we next compute the expected profits of the principal
for the case of retained authority, taking the principal’s actual effort and his beliefs
about the agent’s effort into account.20 Subtracting the expected profit from retained
authority from the expected profit from delegation yields our first measure for the
expected gains from delegation.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative density function of the gains from delegating under
the assumption that the principal would have played a best reply in case he had
delegated. As can be seen in this graph by looking at the mass to the right of
the zero line, 68 percent of observations in the HIGH treatment and 92 percent
of observations from the PHIGH treatment are from individuals who would have
been better off if they had delegated. The retention of authority in the PHIGH
treatment is especially noteworthy since both the principal and the agent would be
made better off through delegation. Thus, in this treatment, the under-delegation is
suboptimal not only from the principals’ perspective, but also from the perspective
of the organization as a whole.
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Figure 4: Cumulative density function of expected gain from delegation if principal best replies to beliefs
One might worry that using the best response to beliefs as a proxy for effort
terfactual case of delegation is given by:
EV dP (E
d = rdP (eˆ
d), eˆd) = eˆdPˆ2 + (1− eˆd)rdP (eˆd)Pˆ1 + P0 − gP (rdP (eˆd)),
where eˆd is the principal’s belief about the agent’s effort under delegation, P0 is the principal’s payout
under the outside option, Pˆ2 is the principal’s payment under the agents preferred project net of P0, Pˆ1 is
the principal’s payment under the principal’s preferred project net of P0, and rdP (eˆ
d) is the best response
function constructed in Equation 9.
20This comparison value is given by
EVP (E, eˆ) = EPˆ1 + (1− E)eˆPˆ2 + P0 − gP (E).
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might overstate the expected return to delegation. Perhaps, some individuals may
not perfectly best respond to their beliefs.
As a conservative secondary measure for the expected gains from delegation, we
next consider the case where the principal provides zero effort after delegation.
This criterion is selected for three reasons. First, an individual who puts in zero
effort has no potential losses and minimal exposure to risk. Relative to the actual
strategies typically employed by principals, the zero effort criterion should thus be
an attractive strategy for principals who are extremely risk or loss averse. Second,
besides very high effort choices which are observed very infrequently, zero effort
minimizes the expected value of delegation giving us the lowest reasonable expected
value of delegation. Finally, zero effort is in fact the modal strategy taken after
delegation suggesting it is a relevant benchmark for analysis.
In Figure 5 we depict the cumulative density function for the expected gains from
delegation under the assumption that the principal would have chosen zero effort if he
had delegated. We find, that 46.8 percent of observations in the HIGH treatment and
75 percent of observations in the PHIGH treatment are from individuals who would
have been better off in case of delegation. This result is remarkable because even if
we assume that principals choose highly suboptimal effort levels after delegation, it
would have often been better for them (given their beliefs) to delegate authority.
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Figure 5: Cumulative density function of expected gain from delegation if principal chooses zero effort
after delegation
One might also be concerned that the under-delegation effect is due to having a
limited number of periods in which to learn the optimal delegation strategy. Per-
haps, under-delegation is a consequence of incomplete learning in our 10 period
experiments.
In order to study this hypothesis, we ran an additional treatment (PHIGH50) in
which we increased the number of periods to 50 and increased the equilibrium returns
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to delegation from 10 percent (in the PHIGH treatment) to 17 percent. As with the
original PHIGH treatment, we use an asymmetric design in which the agent’s pay-
ment for his preferred project is much higher than his payment under the principal’s
preferred project, and where both the principal and agent would benefit highly from
delegation at the equilibrium effort levels.21 To further facilitate learning we also
simplified the design by making the subordinate’s recommendation automatic, i.e.
the controlling party knew with certainty that an informed subordinate would rec-
ommend his preferred project while an uninformed subordinate would recommend
the outside option.
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Figure 6: Average delegation frequencies of principals in the PHIGH50 treatment. Period averages shown
by the diamonds, quadratic time trend shown by the solid line. In total, 32 principals participated in these
50 period experiments.
Figure 6 shows the time path of delegation decisions in this treatment. As can
be seen, while there is an increase in delegation in the first 25 periods, delegation
rates remain fairly constant in the remaining 25 periods. Of the 32 principals in
the treatment, 43.8 percent never switched their delegation decision after period
25. Subjects are also on average fairly persistent in their delegation choice. On
the basis of a median split, we find that those who predominantly keep authority
delegate in only 11 percent of the cases in the second half of this treatment. Those
who predominantly delegate authority keep it in only 12.5 percent of the cases in the
second half of this treatment. Overall, the delegation rate is 8 percent higher in the
21In the PHIGH50 treatment, the payment for the principal and agent under the principal’s preferred
project were 45 and 20 respectively. Under the agent’s preferred project, the payments were 40 (for the
principal) and 45 (for the agent). Equilibrium payoffs were 31 points for the principal and 23.1 points for
the agent if the agent had control, and 26.5 points for the principal and 18.1 points for the agent if the
principal had control. We randomly paid 20 of the 50 periods at the end of the experiment. 64 subjects
participated in two sessions of this treatment, and the average session time of this experiment was 2.5 hours
with an average payment of 72 CHF ($75).
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second half of this treatment compared to the second half of the PHIGH treatment,
but this is what one would expect because of the increased incentives to delegate
in the PHIGH50 treatment. The overall delegation rates in PHIGH50 are, however,
still well below the level predicted by theory, with an average delegation rate of 56.5
percent in the last 25 periods of the experiment. As in the PHIGH treatment, this
large amount of under-delegation occurred despite the fact that both the principals
and the agents were substantially better off in cases where decision rights were
delegated relative to cases where decision rights were held.
Non-pecuniary motivations
The results above suggest that many principals had strong pecuniary incentives
to delegate. They further suggest that a large portion of under-delegation is not due
to incomplete learning. Why then do we observe this strong reluctance to delegate?
One non-pecuniary force behind the principals’ choices appears to be a disutility
from being overruled. Recall that the principal’s return from the agent’s preferred
project is the same regardless of whether the principal is informed or uninformed.
Thus, for a principal who has delegated and faces an agent who selects his preferred
project, the pecuniary value of being informed and uninformed is the same. Condi-
tional on effort, an expected utility maximizing principal in the subordinate position
should be indifferent between the case where she is informed and overruled by the
agent and where she remains uninformed. Thus, her response to being overruled
and receiving the payoff from the agent’s preferred project should be identical to
her response to being uninformed and receiving the payoff of the agent’s preferred
project. However, if a principal experiences a non-pecuniary disutility from being
overruled, her response to these two outcomes may differ: In the next period, the
principal may correctly anticipate the potential disutility from being overruled and,
therefore, she may be less willing to delegate.
To examine spillovers across periods, we take the principals who delegate in pe-
riod t − 1 and regress the probability of delegating in period t on the information
the principal and agent received in the previous period. To account for potential
differences in effort and beliefs, we also condition on the effort of the principal in
the previous period and the beliefs the principal has about the agent’s action in the
current period.
Table 5 reports the marginal effects of this regression for various subsets of our
data. The omitted category in all regressions is the case in which both the principal
and the agent are uninformed. As can be seen in column (1), the principal is more
likely to delegate in period t if either she was informed in t − 1 or the agent was
informed in t − 1. However, when both the principal and agent were informed in
t−1 and the principal was overruled by the agent, her delegation probability falls to
the same level that also prevails if both were uninformed in the previous period, i.e.
when the outside option was implemented. This suggests that the principal reacts
negatively to being overruled — a behavior that cannot be explained if the principal
maximizes the expected utility from her monetary payoffs only. The behavioral
response to overruling is robust to specifications which include period dummies and
belief data (column (2)), and specifications which use only the HIGH and PHIGH
treatments where delegation is expected to take place (column (3)).
The importance of the overruling effect is also corroborated by data from questions
in the ex-post survey administered after the PHIGH50 treatments in April 2011. We
asked participants in the role of the principal to evaluate two delegation scenarios
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in both of which they delegated and the agent’s project is implemented, and which
differ only in whether they were informed or not. On a 7-point likert scale, the
scenario in which the principal was uninformed had an average evaluation of 5.97
while the scenario in which the principal was informed and thus overruled had a
lower average evaluation of 4.59. This difference is highly significant both in a
paired t-test (p < 0.01) and in a non-parametric sign-rank test (p < 0.01).22 Hence,
even though the monetary outcome is identical across both scenarios, principals
on average assigned significantly lower value to the scenario in which they were
overruled.
Table 5: Delegation conditional on previous experience
(1) (2) (3)
principal informed in t− 1 0.170 0.194* 0.191
(0.120) (0.110) (0.129)
agent informed in t− 1 0.208*** 0.189*** 0.122**
(0.062) (0.061) (0.059)
overruled in t− 1 –0.371** –0.410*** –0.323**
(0.153) (0.149) (0.159)
effort in t− 1 –0.004** –0.005 –0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Treatment Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Belief & Time Controls? No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.170 0.249 0.199
Observations 360 360 271
Marginal Effects from a probit regression are reported in the table. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. Sample is restricted to principals
who delegated in t − 1. Neither principal nor agent informed is the omitted category. Regressions (1) and
(2) contain the data from all treatments. Regression (3) contains only data from the HIGH and PHIGH
treatments, where delegation is predicted. Belief controls are beliefs of principals under both authority
allocations. Time controls are period fixed effects.
We performed another test of the hypothesis that the non-pecuniary disutility of
being overruled causes a reluctance to delegate by conducting two additional 25-
period treatments which had nearly identical equilibrium returns to delegation but
varied in the extent to which overruling was possible. The first of these treatments
restricted the subordinate’s effort to zero and did not allow them to make recommen-
dations. This treatment was symmetric with a payment of 40 if the own preferred
project was chosen and 30 if the other party’s preferred project was chosen. We
refer to this treatment as HIGH NOREC. There are relatively high (15.8 percent)
equilibrium returns to delegation since the commitment not to exert effort as the
subordinate increases the effort exerted by the controlling party. We compare this
data to a 25 period version of the PHIGH50 treatment (PHIGH25) which had similar
equilibrium returns to delegation.23
22The two survey questions were randomly ordered and asked on separate screens of the exit survey.
23The 25 period experiments lasted on average 1.75 hours, 32 subjects participated in the PHIGH25 treat-
ment and 28 subjects participated in the HIGH NOREC treatment. Pooling earnings across the treatments,
subjects earned 44 CHF ($47) on average.
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Recall that the difference between the HIGH NOREC and the PHIGH25 treat-
ment is that in the former the principals cannot be overruled. Therefore, if the
principals derive disutility from being overruled they should be more willing to del-
egate in HIGH NOREC. We find indeed that the average delegation rate of the
HIGH NOREC treatment was higher (67.1 percent) than in the PHIGH25 treat-
ment (41.3 percent) - a difference that is statistically significant (p = 0.011).24 The
higher delegation rate in HIGH NOREC occurred despite the fact that the empirical
return on delegation is 21 percentage points higher in the PHIGH25 treatment than
in HIGH NOREC. For this reason, the higher delegation rates in HIGH NOREC
provide additional support for the hypothesis that being overruled is associated with
disutility.
What is the source of this disutility? A plausible answer to this question is pro-
vided by the notion of regret aversion (which we formalize in Appendix A). To
examine the role of regret aversion in our setting it is useful to recall that the prin-
cipals chose considerably higher effort in the role of the controlling party compared
to when they were the subordinate party. Therefore, if the principals in the subor-
dinate role became informed about which project was best for them they knew that
they would also have been informed if they had kept the decision right. In other
words, they could have chosen their best project if they had kept their decision
right. It is thus quite plausible that the principals regretted their delegation deci-
sion when they were informed and the agent’s preferred project was implemented.
If this regret is psychologically aversive the delegation option becomes less valuable.
This account of under-delegation in terms of regret aversion can explain the follow-
ing four facts: (i) the under-delegation of authority in the HIGH and the PHIGH
treatment (ii) the sharp reduction in delegation rates after being overruled; (iii) the
subjects’ preference (in the post-experimental survey) for being not informed about
their best project when the agent’s preferred project is implemented anyway; and
(iv) the much higher delegation rate when the experimental design rules out ex-post
regret by preventing the principal from providing effort after delegation.
Our explanation of under-delegation in terms of regret aversion would receive
further support if an individual measure of regret aversion would predict individ-
ual differences in the reluctance to delegate. Subjects’ behavior in the lottery task
described in Section III.B may be interpreted as such an individual difference mea-
sure. If the subjects’ reluctance to accept the lotteries is at least partly driven by
subjects’ regret aversion, the propensity to reject lotteries should also predict the
reluctance to delegate (in the treatments were overruling can occur). This is in fact
what we observe. In Appendix C (Table C-3) we report probit regressions of prin-
cipals’ delegation choices with treatment conditions, period fixed effects, principals’
beliefs about agents’ effort and the number of rejected lotteries as explanatory vari-
ables. Individuals in the HIGH and PHIGH treatments are 12 percent less likely
to delegate for each gamble in the lottery task that they decline (p = .021). If we
combine the observations in the HIGH and PHIGH treatment, and split the sample
at median lottery acceptance, the difference in delegation frequency between the
group which accepts more gambles and the group which accepts fewer gambles is
20 percent. These findings further support the view that regret aversion appears
to be an important motive behind the reluctance to delegate authority. The next
subsections will show that the same motive may also partly explain the controlling
24This p-value is calculated using a probit regression controlling for period fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by the individual.
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and the subordinate parties’ effort choices.
C. Exploring the controlling parties’ over-provision of effort
We saw in Figure 3 that the provision of effort by the controlling party exceeds the
Nash equilibrium prediction across all treatments while the effort of the subordinate
is below the Nash prediction. These deviations are persistent, with no convergence
to the Nash equilibrium over time.25
Persistent deviations from the Nash equilibrium might be due to one of two
sources. First, for a given belief about the other party’s effort, an individual may re-
spond to those beliefs differently than the best reply. For example, if the controlling
party systematically over-provides effort relative to the best reply, his or her effort
is likely to be higher than the Nash equilibrium effort. Likewise, if the subordinate
party under-provides effort relative to the best reply, then the effort is likely to be
lower than the Nash equilibrium effort.
Second, beliefs about the other party’s effort provision may deviate from those
predicted in the Nash equilibrium. Because of strategic substitutability, a controlling
party whose beliefs about subordinate effort are below those predicted by the Nash
equilibrium will increase his or her effort relative to the Nash equilibrium. Likewise
a subordinate party whose beliefs are above the Nash equilibrium will decrease effort
in substitution. In this subsection we examine both the best reply channel and the
belief channel as potential sources of the controlling parties’ over-provision of effort.
We first look at systematic deviations from the best response function by con-
structing the theoretical best response for the controlling party if control is kept
and if control is delegated under the assumption of risk neutrality:
(12) rP (eˆ) =
100Pˆ1 − eˆPˆ2
50
, rdA(Eˆ
d) =
100Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1
50
.
By comparing these best responses with the actual response of controlling parties to
their beliefs, we can examine systematic deviations from the best response function.
Figure 7 shows this comparison pooled for all treatments. The dashed 45◦ line
represents those cases where the actual response to beliefs coincides with the best
response to these beliefs. Points above the 45◦ line represent observations in which
the controlling party over-provides relative to the best response while points below
the 45◦ line represent an under-provision of effort.
The solid line in Figure 7 shows the empirical relationship between the actual re-
sponse to beliefs about the subordinates’ effort and the best response. The positive
slope of this line indicates that the best response has some (qualitative) predic-
tive power. However, the overwhelming feature in the data is the systematic over-
provision of effort by the controlling party relative to the best response. Counting
all observations strictly above the 45◦ line, 66 percent of observations for principals
and 77 percent of observations for agents provide more effort than is predicted by
a best response to beliefs. The magnitude of this over-provision is typically large,
with 48 percent of observations 15 points or more above prediction.
While Figure 7 shows the combined data across all treatments, the pattern doesn’t
vary qualitatively across treatments. Table 6 shows the average effort of the con-
25Looking at agents’ effort in the first 5 periods and the last 5 periods of the four main treatments, average
effort declines by 2.4 points as a subordinate (p = 0.014 if effort is regressed on a dummy for periods 6-10)
and decreases by .2 points as controlling party (p = 0.76).
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Figure 7: Controlling party: Actual effort vs. best response to beliefs (Combined data from all main
treatments)
Table 6: Comparison of effort provision of the controlling party to the best response to beliefs
Principal has control Agent has control
actual best response actual best response
effort effort effort effort
PLOW 55.7 53.9 68.1 *** 49.1
LOW 66.1 *** 54.5 68.3 *** 55.8
HIGH 48.2 *** 42.1 58.7 *** 45.3
PHIGH 58.2 ** 45.9 65.1 ** 56.2
Significance levels calculated using a Signed-Rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior
to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
trolling party and the corresponding average of the best response to beliefs. As can
be seen, effort provision of the controlling party is above the average best response
prediction in all treatments and for both authority allocations, and in 7 of these 8
cases the difference is significant.26
Based on this data, we conclude:
RESULT 5: Controlling parties over-provide effort relative to their best response to
beliefs about the subordinate’s effort.
Result 5 suggests that having authority appears to have a motivational effect on
26Technically, the effort provisions of individuals within a matching group may be correlated due to shared
histories. However, as the information concerning the actions of others in the matching group is limited, we
expect the effect of heterogeneous learning to be limited. As an additional control, we ran matching group-
clustered versions of each sign-rank and rank-sum test included in this paper to check whether matching
group-level effects are driving our results. As expected, the p-values of these tests are slightly higher but
have a minor effect on the significance levels reported throughout the paper. See Datta and Satten (2008)
and Datta and Satten (2005) for details of the two tests.
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the effort provision of the controlling parties. We next turn to beliefs. Since the effort
of the two parties are strategic substitutes, deviations from the Nash Equilibrium
prediction may partially be explained by pessimistic beliefs of controlling parties.
Table 7 compares actual beliefs to the Nash Equilibrium beliefs for all treatments
and both authority allocations. As can be seen by comparing the first two columns,
the principal’s belief about agent effort if control is kept is comparable to the Nash
Equilibrium prediction. In fact, in three out of four cases (i.e. in PLOW, LOW
and HIGH) the principals’ effort expectation is above eNE , but the deviation is not
significant. Thus, pessimistic beliefs of the principal cannot contribute to the over-
provision of effort in these cases. The situation is somewhat different if authority was
delegated. Here, the controlling party (the agents) expected in all four treatments
that the subordinate party will under-provide effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
Thus, beliefs of the agents do account for some of the over-provision of effort relative
to the Nash Equilibrium prediction.27
Table 7: Comparison of actual beliefs of the controlling party to the Nash prediction
Principal has control Agent has control
Nash prediction actual belief Nash prediction actual belief
PLOW 25 30.4 35 *** 21.8
LOW 25 27.5 25 * 20.9
HIGH 35 35.8 35 * 29.4
PHIGH 35 * 28.2 25 ** 19.0
Significance levels calculated using a Signed-Rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior
to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
D. Exploring the subordinate parties’ under-provision of effort
We next examine possible reasons for deviations from the Nash equilibrium on the
part of the subordinates. We will again examine the role of beliefs as well as the
role of systematic deviations from the best response function as potential sources of
the observed deviation of effort relative to the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the theoretical best response and the ac-
tual response function for the subordinates. As before, the 45◦ line represents the
predicted best response function of the subordinate in response to beliefs about the
effort of the controlling party while the solid line shows the empirical best response
behavior from a simple linear regression. Points above the 45◦ line represent obser-
vations in which the subordinate over-provides effort relative to the best response
while points below the 45◦ line represent an under-provision of effort.
As can be seen in the left hand panel of the figure, the actual response function is
positively sloped but relatively flat, suggesting a relatively weak effort response to
beliefs. Unlike the controlling parties’ efforts, which were clustered above the best
response correspondence, effort provisions by subordinates are heterogeneous: 52
percent of individual choices are below the best response to beliefs for agents, while
56 percent of individual choices are below the best response to beliefs for principals.
27Table C-4 in Appendix C shows that beliefs of controlling parties about subordinate effort do, on
average, exceed actual subordinate effort.
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Figure 8: Subordinates: actual effort vs. best response to beliefs (Combined data from all main treatments)
In addition, a large number of individual choices are considerably below the best
response.
A particularly salient fact in Figure 8 is that a large number of subordinates put
in zero effort, i.e., lack of control appears to have a strong demotivational effect for
a large minority. Recall that the cost of effort is convex with the cost of increasing
effort from 0 to 5 equalling gP (5) − gP (0) = .06 points. Since incremental effort is
nearly costless, zero effort is predicted only in cases where the subordinate believes
in an effort of 100 by the controlling party, which almost never occurred.
The heterogeneous behavior of subordinates also appears to be a robust phe-
nomenon at the treatment level. As shown in Table 8, which reports the average
effort of the subordinate, the average theoretical best response to beliefs, and the
proportion of individuals who provide zero effort for each treatment and for prin-
cipals and agents separately. As can be seen by comparing the first two columns
of each treatment, there is little difference between the actual effort and the theo-
retical best response to beliefs at the mean. The similarity in these two averages
reflects the heterogeneous nature of subordinate effort provision where both under
and over-provision of effort is observed.
Looking at the third column of each row, it is apparent that zero-effort is a modal
strategy for the subordinates in all treatments. Zero effort is observed 25 percent
of the time in all eight cases and in three of these cases, zero effort accounts for
for roughly 50 percent of the observations.28 The high frequency of observed zeroes
28One possible explanation for zero effort is that individuals who exert zero effort simply don’t understand
the environment. In studying the effort that agents exert as the controlling party, however, this explanation is
unlikely. Remember that we collect effort choices of agents in both roles, the subordinate and the controlling
party. We can therefore directly compare whether those subjects who exert zero effort as subordinates are
different from those who do not when in the controlling party role. A regression of controlling party effort
on a dummy that takes on the value 1 if subordinate effort is zero, controlling for treatment and clustering
standard errors at the individual level, reveals that those agents who chose zero effort as subordinates on
average exert 3 units of additional effort (this difference is not significant (p=0.35)). In fact, as will be
discussed later in section IV.E, a positive difference is to be expected if regret aversion directly affects effort
choices. This suggests that a lack of understanding is not the driver of zero effort choices.
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Table 8: Comparison of effort of subordinates to their best response to beliefs
Agents in subordinate role Principals in subordinate role
actual best response percent actual best response percent
effort to beliefs zero effort to beliefs zero
PLOW 22.8 21.1 39.0 16.5 24.2 36.7
LOW 14.3 ** 19.8 49.4 16.2 18.9 54.0
HIGH 26.5 24.6 28.5 19.6 26.3 36.8
PHIGH 17.3 18.4 50.3 20.7 22.6 36.7
Significance levels calculated using a Signed-Rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior
to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
is due in large part to a subset of individuals who always exert zero effort in the
subordinate role.29
Based on these observations, we conclude:
RESULT 6: The subordinates effort behavior is heterogeneous. While on average
effort provision is close to the theoretical best response, there is a large group of
subordinates who provide zero effort, far below the optimal best response. For this
group, authority appears to have a strong demotivational effect. In addition, there
is a smaller group of subordinates who systematically over-provide effort.
Turning to beliefs, Table 9 shows the beliefs of the subordinate compared to the
Nash Equilibrium. As can be seen, agents and principals have optimistic beliefs
relative to the Nash equilibrium. As optimistic beliefs are expected to lead to a
decrease in effort, beliefs may be contributing to the under-provision of effort by
the agent and the principals. However, as we noted in Figure 8, the actual response
function is much flatter than would be predicted by the best response. Whereas
theory would predict that effort increases by 6 points when beliefs fall by 10 points,
the actual response to beliefs is significantly smaller. For agents, a 10 point reduction
in beliefs about the controlling parties’ effort only leads to a 1.6 point increase in
effort.30
E. The motivational and demotivational forces of authority: non-pecuniary explanations
Thus far we have seen that for both the controlling party and the subordinate,
deviations from best response behavior account for much of the observed departure
from the Nash predictions. A significant proportion of controlling parties provide
effort which exceeds the best response function leading to effort levels higher than
predicted. Similarly, a significant proportion of subordinates provide zero effort
despite the almost negligible cost of providing incremental effort. Having established
these observational facts, the question remains which behavioral force shows promise
in rationalizing our data.
29Between 18 and 33 percent of agents exert zero effort in nine or ten periods. Between 8 and 50 percent
of principals who delegated at least once exerted zero effort after each delegation.
30For principals, effort increases by 3.8 points when beliefs fall by 10 points. Both coefficients are signif-
icantly smaller than the theoretically expected 6 point increase (p < 0.01) in a simple regression of effort
on beliefs. Table C-4 in Appendix C reports beliefs about controlling party effort in comparison to actual
controlling party effort choices.
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Table 9: Comparison of actual beliefs of subordinates to the Nash prediction
Agents in subordinate role Principals in subordinate role
Nash prediction actual belief Nash prediction actual belief
PLOW 55 *** 64.8 45 *** 59.6
LOW 55 *** 66.9 55 *** 68.4
HIGH 45 *** 59.0 45 *** 56.2
PHIGH 45 ** 69.3 55 *** 62.3
Significance levels calculated using a Signed-Rank test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual prior
to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
As we saw in the delegation section, many aspects of our data support the in-
terpretation that regret aversion is an important force behind the under-delegation
of authority. Might the same behavioral force also have promise to rationalize the
observed deviations in effort choices?
To begin our analysis, we take the same overruling effect which was found to be of
importance in delegation and ask to what extent it can explain the effort patterns of
a subordinate. Recall that as a subordinate there is the potential of being overruled.
If such overruling generates non-pecuniary losses — as predicted by regret aversion
— a subordinate who anticipates this disutility may reduce effort thereby reducing
the probability with which overruling occurs (see Appendix A for more details). For
cases where this non-pecuniary loss is particularly strong, effort provision in the
subordinate role may be driven to zero.
The explanation that zero effort is a response to anticipatory regret would receive
support if our individual measure of regret aversion would correlate with individual
differences in zero effort. Our interpretation is supported in precisely this way: In a
probit regression, the probability that a subordinate exerts zero effort increases by
5.9 percent per additional gamble rejected (p=0.030).31
Regret in the domain of effort choices may also result in an over-provision of effort
by the controlling party if there is a non-pecuniary disutility for being unsuccessful
in implementing one’s own preferred project. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) have
shown that individuals who lose in first price sealed bid auctions to bids which
are below their true valuation behave as if they experience “loser regret”, i.e., these
individuals behave as if they suffer a disutility from losing when they could have won,
and earned profit, by making a higher bid. In our setting, the controlling party may
hence regret his or her effort choice in cases where it remains uninformed and thus
could have improved the project selection by putting in more effort. An individual
in the role of the controlling party who anticipates such regret optimally raises his
or her effort (see Appendix A for more details). Again, we can test this conjecture
by using regression analysis and looking at the correlation between over-provision of
effort and our individual measure of regret aversion. In a probit regression, we find
that the probability of over-provision increases by 4.5 percent per additional gamble
rejected (p=0.058).32 Thus, taken together, regret aversion may be a driving force
31A dummy variable is created that takes on the value 1 in case of zero effort provision in the role of
the subordinate. Data from the four main treatments is included in this regression. The probit regression
also contains controls for the treatment, being in the role of the agent, interactions of role and treatment,
controls for beliefs, and period dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
32A dummy variable is created that takes on the value 1 if a subject over-provided effort in the role of
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behind all three major experimental patterns - the under-delegation of authority,
the high frequency of zero effort choices among subordinates and the over-provision
of effort by the controlling parties.33
While regret aversion shows promise in rationalizing our data, it is reasonable to
ask whether alternative hypotheses show similar promise. Could it be, for example,
that the agents’ effort choices are influenced by reciprocity or other forms of social
preferences? Or, may risk or loss aversion generate a similar pattern to regret
aversion?
A common reason for deviations from standard economic predictions is the exis-
tence of social preferences. In our setting, if agents view the delegation of authority
as a kind act they may over-provide effort because of reciprocal motivations. Like-
wise, if they view a lack of delegation as an unkind act they may under-provide
effort relative to their best response. Thus, positive and negative reciprocity may, in
principle, explain the agents’ effort pattern. We tested for the impact of reciprocity
motives by conducting an additional treatment in the HIGH condition in which the
delegation decision was decided exogenously by the computer. In this HIGH RAND
treatment, a virtual coin is flipped each period which determines whether control
rights are kept by the principal or whether the principal is forced to delegate them.
Since the agents know that the principals are forced to make a choice it is impos-
sible to attribute kind or unkind intentions to the principal. If positive or negative
reciprocity play a role, the agents’ effort choices in the HIGH RAND condition will
deviate from their choices in the HIGH condition. However, neither as a controlling
party (Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p = .20) nor in the position of the subordinate
party (Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p = .99) do the agents’ effort choices differ in the
two conditions, implying that reciprocity is unlikely to explain their effort pattern.
In all of our treatments, the controlling party over-provides effort relative to her
best response which directly increases the expected earnings of the subordinate.
Thus, altruism on the part of the controlling parties could explain this pattern of
effort. To control for this possibility we implemented an additional control treatment
with the following features. Only one of the two subjects was given the ability to
provide effort and to choose the project, but both parties were paid based on the
controlling party’s project choice. Thus, in this treatment the passive party never
receives the decision right and never makes an effort choice but only collects her
payoffs. We compare this treatment with the single player game (described at the
beginning of Section III.C) which is identical to the above control treatment except
that no passive recipient exists. Thus in the additional control treatment social
preferences can affect the active subject’s effort while in the single player game
social preferences cannot play a role. It turns out that the effort choices of the
active party and the single player are indistinguishable (Kolmogorov Smirnov test,
p = 0.44), indicating that social preferences do not significantly affect effort.
Another potential reason for deviations from theoretical predictions is that the
the controlling party on average. Data from the four main treatments is included in this regression. The
regression also contains controls for the treatment, being in the role of the agent, and interactions of role
and treatment. Each individual in our data set who chose effort in the controlling party role at least once
is an observation.
33As was stated in result 6, we also observe a minority of subordinates who actually over-provide effort
relative to their best response. In Appendix A we show that heterogeneity in subordinate effort is also
consistent with a model with both loser regret and overrule regret. Recall that the role of controlling
party is influenced only by loser regret, and therefore individuals are predicted to exert effort above the
Nash Equilibrium in this role. As the subordinate, an individual is exposed both to the potential of being
overruled and the potential of loser regret. These forces go in opposite directions, and the response in effort
will therefore depend on an individual’s inclination towards both types of regret.
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behind all three major experimental patterns - the under-delegation of authority,
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assumption of expected value maximization may be violated due to loss aversion.
In the Appendix D, we show that loss aversion with a reference point at the outside
option cannot explain the over-provision of effort by the controlling parties. The
intuitive reason for this claim is as follows. For loss averse individuals, an increase
in effort above the risk neutral optimum increases the magnitude of a potential loss
which reduces utility. This follows from the fact that an increase in effort causes
a sure increase in costs but as long as the possibility of success is below 1 the
controlling parties’ ex post payoff from unsuccessful search may not cover the effort
cost. Thus, for reasonable amounts of loss aversion, optimal effort is decreasing
in an individual’s degree of loss aversion. For unrealistically extreme levels of loss
aversion, an individual may prefer to guarantee a payoff rather than playing any
lottery. For controlling parties with such extreme levels of loss aversion, providing
maximal effort (which guarantees a payoff of 15) may be preferable to providing low
effort and hoping for success by the subordinate. In these cases, loss aversion would
predict a maximal effort level of 100.
Looking at both cases in combination, loss aversion cannot explain effort levels
which are above the best response function but below an effort level of 100. As
these are the observations which need to be rationalized in order to explain the
over-provision of effort by the controlling parties, loss aversion cannot explain our
effort results.
In Appendix E, we show that similar to loss aversion, neither risk aversion nor risk
loving preferences can account for over-provision of effort by the controlling party.
Moreover, neither risk nor loss aversion can explain the subordinates’ choice of zero
effort levels because effort costs are negligible at low effort levels. For example,
assuming risk aversion, beliefs about controlling party effort need to be extremely
high to rationalize a subordinate’s effort choice of zero. Using a CRRA utility
specification of the following form, U(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , an effort of 0 is only predicted if the
belief in controlling party effort is 100 (up to σ = 8). Hence, only for counterfactually
high beliefs (or unrealistically extreme levels of risk aversion) is zero effort expected
to occur.
V. Conclusion
Authority and power permeate political, social and economic interactions. It is
therefore important to understand their motivation and incentive effects. In this
paper we tackle this question by using a novel experimental design. We find a
strong behavioral bias among principals to retain authority against their pecuniary
interests and often to the disadvantage of both the principal and the agent. We
demonstrate that under-delegation cannot be attributed to principals’ beliefs nor
incomplete learning, and that the individual and aggregate income losses of this
delegation bias are substantial. Our results suggest that authority has non-pecuniary
consequences that inhibit the reallocation of authority.
Our results also show that authority has effects on the motivation to provide ef-
fort that are not captured by the theoretical model. The fundamental trade-off
between incentives and control, as modeled by Aghion and Tirole (1997), indeed
exists; relative to the first best the subordinate provides too little effort, and the
controlling party provides too much. Further, the comparative statics between treat-
ments are well met. However, the inefficiency generated by the incentive conflict is
much greater than predicted by theory. The controlling parties provide significantly
more effort and the subordinate parties provide significantly less relative to the Nash
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Equilibrium prediction. For controlling parties and a large fraction of subordinates,
this is also true relative to the best response to beliefs.
A deeper look at our data suggests that a distaste for being overruled is a substan-
tial determinant of the desire to retain control. Principals who are overruled after
delegation and earn the return from the agent’s preferred project are less likely to
delegate in the future relative to those who are uninformed and earn the very same
return. This difference in delegation behavior — driven by informational states and
not by pecuniary payoffs — suggests that individuals are suffering a non-pecuniary
disutility from being overruled. One potential source of such non-pecuniary disutil-
ity is regret, a theory which can also help to explain the high frequency of zero effort
among subordinates and the over-provision of effort by the controlling parties.
Given the importance of authority and power in the functioning of economic and
political organizations we believe that the motivational biases revealed by our data
should receive more attention. In addition, further explorations into the motives
behind delegation and control are suggested by our data. Although a significant
part of underdelegation can be explained by principals’ regret aversion we also ob-
served a nonnegligible underdelegation in the treatment HIGH NOREC where the
principals’ recommendation could not be overruled after delegation. This raises the
question whether some subjects intrinsically prefer to be the controlling rather than
the subordinate party. In Bartling, Fehr and Herz (2012) we show that this is in-
deed the case. Moreover, it is well possible that delegation of authority is affected
by the mechanism by which authority has been initially assigned. For example, if
the possession of authority is the result of prior superior performance, the principals
might even be more reluctant to delegate compared to the random assignment of
authority. This additional underdelegation may result from the perception of su-
perior competence, from overconfidence, or from the status gains associated with
a position of authority. In addition, research on the cultural determinants of the
sources of under-delegation and the motivational effects of decision rights may be
interesting because societies seem to be quite heterogeneous with regard to how they
view and legitimize hierarchical structures.
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APPENDIX
A. Regret Theory
This appendix examines the extent to which regret theory can rationalize our
data. It is divided into three parts. In part one, we consider the effort stage of the
experiment and concentrate on the decision problem of an agent. We consider two
different sources of regret: loser regret and overrule regret. An agent experiences
loser regret if he remains uninformed but could have achieved a higher payoff had
he chosen a higher effort and been informed. An agent experiences overrule regret
if he is in the role of the subordinate, the controlling party is informed, and the
agent’s recommendation is disregarded or his effort is wasted. We show that loser
regret and overrule regret can rationalize important aspects of the agents’ behavior.
In particular, loser regret induces agents in the position of the controlling party to
overexert effort relative to the best reply of those without loser regret. Overrule re-
gret, by contrast, induces agents in the subordinate position to reduce effort relative
to agents who have no overrule regret.
In part two, we show that these two regret forces also suffice to explain effort
choices as well as under-delegation of authority by the principals. In part three,
we extend the analysis of the principal and include a third form of regret that
only principals can experience: delegation regret. In contrast to the agents, regret
experienced by principals can also stem from their delegation decision, i.e., having
delegated or not having delegated the decision right. We show that including regret
that stems from delegation can further decrease a principal’s utility from delegating
and has effects on effort similar to the regret forces studied in the first two parts.
Part 1: Regret and Effort Decisions of the Agent: In the auction literature, it
has recently been proposed by Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) that a reason for
overbidding in the first price sealed bid auction is that individuals experience “loser
regret.” Loser regret occurs when an individual bids below their valuation and is
beaten by a higher bid that is below their true valuation. In these cases, individuals
experience regret because they would have preferred to bid higher ex post than is
optimal to bid ex ante. An individual who anticipates such regret optimally increases
their bid relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium in order to reduce the potential
states for which regret occurs.
In our experiment, individuals may similarly experience loser regret in cases where
they remain uninformed and thus cannot implement their preferred project. These
will be cases in which an individual’s effort is below the number drawn by the random
number generator that guides success and failure of an individual’s effort.
As the likelihood of being informed, and therefore the likelihood of regret, is based
on an agent’s effort relative to a number drawn by nature, we require a formal way of
expressing these draws. Let xA be the realization of the random number generator
(uniform between 0 and 1) for the agent, where the agent is informed if his effort is
above or equal to the realization of xA and uninformed if it is below xA. Likewise, let
xP be the realization of the number generator for the principal, with the principal
being informed when his effort is above or equal to xP and uninformed if his effort
is below xP .
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34Individuals in the experiment were informed of their own draw from the number generator in each
period. They were uninformed about the other party’s draw. For loser regret and overrule regret considered
in the first part of the appendix, only the information state of the other party matters for regret, not their
actual draw.
2In developing a formal model, we follow Loomes and Sugden (1982) and assume
that loser regret enters utility linearly. Individuals experience loser regret when they
remain uninformed and a project with a lower payoff is implemented compared to
the payoff that would have resulted from the ex-post optimal effort decision of the
individual. The magnitude of regret is related to the difference between the actual
payoff and the payoff from this optimal effort decision.
We begin by considering an agent who has received decision rights and is now the
controlling party. Given an implemented project k, an exerted cost of effort ed, and
a draw from the number generator xA, the agent experiences loser regret equal to
(A-1) λLRmax{[A2 − g(xA)]− [Ak − g(ed)], 0}
any time his preferred project is not implemented, where the parameter λLR ≥ 0 is
the agent’s degree of loser regret. Note that the max function explicitly rules out
rejoicing and that the utility from the improved project choice, A2−Ak must exceed
the additional cost of effort g(xA)− g(ed) in order for loser regret to be positive.
Let Eˆd be the agent’s belief about the principal’s effort in the role of the subordi-
nate. Based on these beliefs and the realizations of xP and xA, the outcome space
can be partitioned into four distinct “cells” which differ in the extent to which regret
influences utility. These cells are shown in figure (A-1).
In cell (i), we assume that an agent does not experience regret since he is informed
and therefore is able to implement his preferred project. In the remaining three
cells, however, the agent’s effort is below the threshold for success (ed < xA) and
the agent is uninformed. In these cases, the agent may regret his insufficient level
of effort if the gain from being informed through improved project selection exceeds
the incremental cost of attaining this information.
In cell (ii), the principal is uninformed and project 0 is recommended. If such a
state is realized, the agent always prefers to be informed and regrets his insufficient
effort level. In cells (iii) and (iv), the principal is informed and recommends project
1. Cell (iii) contains states in which the increased returns due to improved project
choice exceed the cost of raising effort from ed to xA, i.e., states where Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 ≥
gA(xA)− gA(ed), and therefore the agent experiences loser regret. Cell (iv) contains
states in which the additional cost of being informed exceeds its value, and therefore
the agent does not experience loser regret. The threshold between cells (iii) and (iv)
is given by τ(ed), where τ(ed) ≡ min{g−1A (Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + gA(ed)), 1}.35
Considering all four cells for the computation of utility, an agent in the role of the
controlling party has utility udA(e
d|xA, xP , Eˆd) =
(A-2)
=

A2 − gA(ed) if xA ≤ ed,
A0 − gA(ed)− λLR[Aˆ2 − gA(xA) + gA(ed)] if xA > ed & xP > Eˆd,
A1 − gA(ed)− λLR[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 − gA(xA) + gA(ed)] if τ(ed) ≥ xA > ed & xP ≤ Eˆd,
A1 − gA(ed) if xA > τ(ed) > ed & xP ≤ Eˆd.
Intuitively, individuals who are in the role of the controlling party experience
loser regret only in cases where they exert less effort than the amount needed to be
35Since xA is bounded above at 1, τ(e
d) is also bounded above at 1. If τ(ed) = 1 the agent always
experiences loser regret. Note that Aˆ2 − gA(1) + gA(0) > 0 for the parameters chosen so that the agent
always regrets not implementing his best project when the outside option is implemented.
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A1 − gA(ed) if xA > τ(ed) > ed & xP ≤ Eˆd.
Intuitively, individuals who are in the role of the controlling party experience
loser regret only in cases where they exert less effort than the amount needed to be
35Since xA is bounded above at 1, τ(e
d) is also bounded above at 1. If τ(ed) = 1 the agent always
experiences loser regret. Note that Aˆ2 − gA(1) + gA(0) > 0 for the parameters chosen so that the agent
always regrets not implementing his best project when the outside option is implemented.
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Figure A-1: Agent as Controlling Party: As a controlling party, the outcome space can be partitioned
into four cells that differ with regard to the regret experienced by the agent: In cell (i), the agent does not
experience regret because he is informed and can implement his preferred project. In cells (ii) and (iii),
however, a regret averse agent will experience loser regret since he could have achieved a higher payoff had
he increased his effort. In cell (ii), the principal is also uninformed and the agent always experiences loser
regret, since it would have been profitable to increase effort. In cells (iii) and (iv), the principal is informed
and the principal’s preferred project is implemented. In cell (iii), the return from having the agent’s preferred
project implemented, Aˆ2 − Aˆ1, exceeds the additional cost of acquiring the necessary information, given by
gA(xA)−gA(ed). Therefore, the agent experiences loser regret. In cell (iv), the additional effort cost exceeds
the increased project return, and the principal does not experience regret. The cutoff between cells (iii) and
(iv) is given by τ(ed) ≡ min{g−1A (Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + gA(ed)), 1}, where the min function is included to bound τ(ed)
in cases in which Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 exceeds the potential increase in effort costs.
informed. Thus, individuals who anticipate loser regret are likely to increase their
effort relative to that of the best response of a standard expected value maximizer.
The following proposition formalizes this intuition:
PROPOSITION 1: In the effort stage of the authority-delegation game, an agent
who anticipates loser regret and who has received control from a delegating principal
will over exert effort relative to the best response of an individual who maximizes
expected value.
PROOF:
An agent who has anticipatory regret maximizes the expected value of udA(e
d|xA, xP , Eˆd)
over all realizations of xA and xP . Taking into consideration the cases in which regret
will occur, this is equivalent to maximizing:
max
ed
edAˆ2 + (1− ed)EˆdAˆ1 − gA(ed)
− λLR(1− Eˆd)(1− ed)[Aˆ2 − ExA(gA(xA)|xA > ed) + gA(ed)]
− λLREˆd(τ(ed)− ed)[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 − ExA(gA(xA)|xA ∈ (ed, τ(ed))) + gA(ed)]
As the derivative of τ(ed) is discontinuous at 1, the first order condition is solved
4separately for τ(ed) < 1 and τ(ed) = 1. In the case of τ(ed) < 1, two intermediate
results are useful for constructing the first order condition. First note that:
(A-3) − d
ded
(1− ed)ExA(gA(xA)|xA > ed) = −
∫ 1
ed
gA(z)dz = gA(e
d)
by Leipniz’s rule. Further,
(A-4)
− d
ded
(τ(ed)− ed)ExA(gA(xA)|xA ∈ (ed, τ(ed)) = −τ
′
(ed)[Aˆ2− Aˆ1+ gA(ed)]+ gA(ed)
by Leipniz’s rule and the fact that gA(τ(e
d)) = Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + gA(ed). Using these
intermediate calculations, the first order condition of this equation can be expressed
as the following implicit function:
Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1 − g′A(ed) + λLR(1− Eˆd)[Aˆ2 − (1− ed)g
′
A(e
d)]+(A-5)
+λLREˆ
d[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 − (τ(ed)− ed)g′A(ed)] = 0.
Effort is strictly above the best response of a standard expected value maximizer
without regret if for a positive λLR the last two terms are positive when evaluated
at or below the standard best response. Note that at the standard best response
correspondence, g
′
A(e
d) = Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1, we can substitute in for g′A(ed) to test this
restriction. Looking at the last two terms with g
′
A(e
d) replaced with Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1
yields
(A-6) λLR(1− Eˆd)[edAˆ2 + (1− ed)EˆdAˆ1]
for the second to last term and
(A-7) λLREˆ
d[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 − (τ(ed)− ed)[Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1]]
for the last term. Subtracting Eˆd(1− Eˆd)Aˆ1 from expression (A-6) and adding it to
expression (A-7), these two sub-equations can be further rewritten as
(A-8) λLR(1− Eˆd)ed[Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1]
and
(A-9) λLREˆ
d[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + (1− Eˆd)Aˆ1 − (τ(ed)− ed)[Aˆ2 − EˆdAˆ1]].
Expression (A-8) is clearly positive since ed and Ed take intermediate values between
zero and one along the best response function and Aˆ2 > Aˆ1. Expression (A-9) is
decreasing in τ(ed) and thus is (weakly) larger than
(A-10) λLREˆ
d[Aˆ2−Aˆ1+(1−Eˆd)Aˆ1−(1−ed)[Aˆ2−EˆdAˆ1]] = λLREˆded[Aˆ2−EˆdAˆ1],
which is also strictly positive. Thus, expression (A-9) is positive. As both terms are
positive, it follows that an individual who experiences loser regret will exert more
effort than an individual who maximizes expected value for any given belief about
the other parties effort.
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Proposition 1 shows that controlling agents who experience loser regret tend to
overprovide effort relative to an expected value maximizer which rationalizes an
important aspect of our data.36
Turning to the subordinate role, the agent’s optimization problem and the poten-
tial sources of regret change considerably. In particular, as a subordinate the agent
can experience regret whenever the controlling party is informed since subordinate
effort is wasted in these cases and it would have been optimal ex post to free ride on
the informed principal. We refer to this form of regret as overrule regret. Regretting
wasted effort is likely to be particularly salient when the agent is successful and
the information generated from his effort is wasted. To account for the particular
salience of this event, we assume that the agents who are overruled not only experi-
ence regret due to their wasted effort, but also in proportion to the foregone payoffs
lost due to their information being ignored.37
In figure (A-2) we again partition the state space into cells that differ with regard
to the regret experienced by the agent. We continue to assume that no regret is
experienced if the agent receives the payoff from his own preferred project. This
is the case in cell (i), since the agent is informed and the controlling party is not.
In cell (ii), the agent experiences loser regret since both parties remain uninformed
and project 0 is implemented. In such states, the agent regrets his insufficient effort
level since he could have improved project selection had he chosen e = xA.
Cells (iii) and (iv) are cases in which the controlling party is informed. As the
agent in the subordinate role is not in control of final project selection, subordinate
effort in these cases is effectively wasted, and the agent experiences overrule regret.
In cell (iii), the agent remained uninformed and therefore regrets having wasted his
effort. In cell (iv), the agent was informed himself and experiences overrule regret
not only from wasted effort, but also from having his recommendation ignored by
the principal.
As with loser regret, we model “overrule regret” in a linear fashion. Let e be the
effort of the agent in the role of the subordinate and let Eˆ be the agent’s belief about
the principal’s effort in the role of the controlling party. The utility of an agent in
36Note that in principle, individuals may also experience “winner regret” in which an individual regrets
over exertion relative to the level of effort needed to be informed. This force could be added to our model and
would not change the main propositions as long as anticipated loser regret is not outweighed by anticipated
winner regret. Note that if winner regret would be stronger than loser regret one cannot explain the
overprovision of effort by the controlling parties. This suggests that winner regret is weaker than loser
regret in our setting. This is precisely the result reported in Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007), who find strong
evidence of loser regret but conclude that “winner regret” is either a weaker force or unanticipated by
subjects. Therefore, to keep our model simple and parsimonious, we have excluded winner regret from the
analysis.
37Formally, the agent experiences overrule regret equal to λORgA(e) if the principal is informed and the
agent is uninformed, and overrule regret equal to λOR[Aˆ2− Aˆ1+ gA(e)] if both parties are informed and the
agent is overruled. We also considered specifications in which (i) wasted effort and the disutility of being
overruled had different coefficients and (ii) where one of the two forces was excluded. As both forces move in
the same direction, both forms of regret lead to a reduction in effort relative to the standard best response,
and therefore there is no qualitative differences across these models. However, regret proportional to the
foregone payoff (Aˆ2 − Aˆ1) due to the overruled recommendation is necessary to predict zero effort choices
by subordinates. If wasted effort is the only source of overrule regret, the marginal increase in anticipatory
regret at an effort level of zero is zero, implying that positive effort is always predicted. This is not the case
when the foregone payoff (Aˆ2 − Aˆ1) matters for overrule regret.
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Figure A-2: Agent as Subordinate: For agents as subordinates, the state space can be partitioned into
four cells, which differ in the extent to which the agent experiences regret: In cell (i), the agent experiences
no regret because his preferred project is implemented. In cell (ii), the agent experiences loser regret. Here
both parties remain uninformed, implying that the agent could have improved the outcome by raising his
own effort to e = xA. The agent experiences overrule regret from wasted effort whenever the controlling
party is informed, which is the case in cells (iii) and (iv). In cell (iv), overrule regret is particularly strong
because the agent is also informed, but the agent’s recommendation is ignored.
the role of the subordinate is then given by:
(A-11)
uA(e|xA, xP , Eˆ) =

A2 − gA(e) if xA ≤ e & xP > Eˆ
A0 − gA(e)− λLR[Aˆ2 − gA(xA) + gA(e)] if xA > e & xP > Eˆ
A1 − gA(e)− λORgA(e) if xA > e & xP ≤ Eˆ
A1 − gA(e)− λOR[Aˆ2 − Aˆ1 + gA(e)] if xA ≤ e & xP ≤ Eˆ
where λOR ≥ 0 is the agent’s degree of overrule regret.
Just as loser regret can increase effort relative to the best response, individuals
who anticipate overrule regret will decrease effort in order to reduce the possibility
of being overruled. Depending on whether an individual is more sensitive to loser
regret or overrule regret, effort in the subordinate role can be either higher or lower
than the standard best response. Effort may also be zero if individuals experience a
significant amount of overrule regret and the degree of loser regret isn’t too strong.
PROPOSITION 2: In the effort stage of the authority-delegation game, an agent
who is in the role of the subordinate may experience either loser regret or overrule
regret depending on the realized state. Individuals who anticipate a disutility of being
overruled will decrease effort relative to those who do not. Individuals who anticipate
loser regret will increase effort relative to those who do not. As these forces move in
different directions, heterogeneity in anticipatory regret may lead to observed effort
choices both above and below the best response.
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PROOF:
As before, an agent who has anticipatory regret maximizes the expected value of
uA(e
d|xA, xP , Eˆ) over all realizations of xA and xP . After some simplifications, the
agent maximizes:
max
e
Eˆ[Aˆ1 − eλOR(Aˆ2 − Aˆ1)]− gA(e) + [1− Eˆ]Aˆ2[e− λLR(1− e)]+
+ [1− Eˆ](1− e)λLRExA(gA(xA)|xA > e)− [1− Eˆ](1− e)λLRgA(e)− EˆλORgA(e)
(A-12)
Taking the first order condition yields the following implicit function:
(A-13) (1+λLR)[1−Eˆ]Aˆ2−EˆλOR(Aˆ2−Aˆ1) = g′A(e)[1+(1−Eˆ)(1−e)λLR+EˆλOR]
As [1 − Eˆ][1 − e] < 1 − Eˆ, effort is again higher when λLR is positive. However,
since the left hand side is decreasing in λOR while the right hand side is increasing,
overrule regret leads to a decrease in effort relative to an expected value maximizer.
As overrule regret and loser regret go in opposite directions, effort choices as a sub-
ordinate should be heterogeneous depending on the magnitude of these forces in
individuals’ utility functions.
Part 2: Overrule Regret and the Delegation Decision of the Principal: Having
considered how regret affects the effort decision of an agent in the controlling party
and the subordinate role, we next turn to the effort and delegation decisions of the
principal. Just as with the agent, a principal can experience loser regret in cases
where her best project is not implemented and overrule regret in cases where she
is in the subordinate role and the agent is informed. Analogous to the agent, these
forces increase the principal’s effort as a controlling party and can lead her to under
or over-exert effort after delegation, i.e. when she is the subordinate.
Propositions (1) and (2) and analogous results for the principal thus show that
loser regret and overrule regret can rationalize the effort patterns observed in our
experimental data. Controlling parties with loser regret will over provide effort rel-
ative to the risk neutral best reply of an individual without loser regret. Rational
subordinates who anticipate the increased effort of the controlling party will up-
date their beliefs upward (as observed in the data) and have an incentive to reduce
their effort relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. In addition, regret averse
subordinates with strong enough overrule regret will have an incentive to further
decrease their effort below the risk neutral best reply because this reduces overrule
regret. If anticipated, this decrease in subordinate effort will further increase effort
of the controlling party. Taken together, equilibrium effort provision is expected to
be larger for controlling parties and smaller for subordinates if regret aversion exists
compared to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium without regret.
It turns out that these same forces can also result in under delegation by the
principal. As overrule regret has a negative utility that arises only in the case of
delegation, overrule regret decreases the utility of delegation relative to the utility
of keeping control. Thus overrule regret can lead to under delegation relative to a
standard expected utility maximizer.38
38The effects of loser regret on delegation are more subtle and may go in either direction depending on
the efforts chosen by the principal and agent.
8PROPOSITION 3: Overrule regret decreases the utility of delegation and has no
effect on the utility of keeping control. Thus individuals who experience overrule
regret may keep control rights even in cases in which expected value comparisons
predict delegation.
PROOF:
This proposition follows from a direct comparison of the utility for a principal
holding control and delegating.
Part 3: Regret Due to the Delegation Choice: While we can capture all the main
deviations observed in our data with loser regret and overrule regret, a formulation
using only these two forces ignores the fact that the principal’s decision problem and
the agent’s decision problem differ in the delegation stage. In order to understand
how regret over the delegation decision might affect the principal’s decisions, this
section extends the model to include regret that might occur due to the principal’s
delegation choice.
In modeling regret over the delegation choice, we take a direct extension of the
baseline model where a principal compares the outcome of his selected delegation and
effort decision pair with the decision pair which would maximize his payoff ex post
given information about the state of nature and beliefs about agent behavior. To
ensure consistency, we hold the beliefs about the effort of the agent in the subgame
which was not entered constant.39 We also rule out the analogue of winner regret by
assuming that the minimum effort that an individual believes she will exert in the
counterfactual where she kept control rights is equal to the amount of effort actually
exerted after delegation (i.e., we restrict the counterfactual E to be greater or equal
to Ed).
We begin by studying the effort decision of a principal who keeps control. In cases
where the principal’s preferred project is not implemented, a principal has two pos-
sible ways in which she might alter her actions to improve her final payoff. First, if
she continues to maintain control, the principal can increase effort to E = xP , thus
ensuring her preferred project is implemented. Second, if in case of delegation the
agent is informed, the principal could instead delegate control to the agent. In this
alternative case, the principal’s optimal subordinate effort is zero since the informed
agent will anyway implement his preferred project, regardless of the principal’s rec-
ommendation. As a naming convention, we define delegation regret as regret which
occurs in states where the principal would prefer to change her delegation decision.
In figure (A-3) we again partition the state space into cells that differ with regard to
the regret experienced by the principal. In cell (i), we continue to assume that no re-
gret is experienced if the principal is informed and can choose her preferred project.
If the principal remains uninformed, however, she experiences either loser regret or
delegation regret. In cell (ii), the agent remains uninformed even if the principal
delegates decision rights. In this case, the principal can improve her payoff by in-
creasing her own effort, and therefore she experiences loser regret. In cells (iii) and
(v), the principal remains uninformed and the agent is informed, such that project
2 is chosen. In these cases, the principal could have improved her payoff by either
keeping the decision right and increasing her own effort to xP , or by delegating the
39For example, if the principal keeps control, she does not update her beliefs about the effort the agent
would have put in she had delegated regardless of the effort observed from the agent in the subordinate role.
8PROPOSITION 3: Overrule regret decreases the utility of delegation and has no
effect on the utility of keeping control. Thus individuals who experience overrule
regret may keep control rights even in cases in which expected value comparisons
predict delegation.
PROOF:
This proposition follows from a direct comparison of the utility for a principal
holding control and delegating.
Part 3: Regret Due to the Delegation Choice: While we can capture all the main
deviations observed in our data with loser regret and overrule regret, a formulation
using only these two forces ignores the fact that the principal’s decision problem and
the agent’s decision problem differ in the delegation stage. In order to understand
how regret over the delegation decision might affect the principal’s decisions, this
section extends the model to include regret that might occur due to the principal’s
delegation choice.
In modeling regret over the delegation choice, we take a direct extension of the
baseline model where a principal compares the outcome of his selected delegation and
effort decision pair with the decision pair which would maximize his payoff ex post
given information about the state of nature and beliefs about agent behavior. To
ensure consistency, we hold the beliefs about the effort of the agent in the subgame
which was not entered constant.39 We also rule out the analogue of winner regret by
assuming that the minimum effort that an individual believes she will exert in the
counterfactual where she kept control rights is equal to the amount of effort actually
exerted after delegation (i.e., we restrict the counterfactual E to be greater or equal
to Ed).
We begin by studying the effort decision of a principal who keeps control. In cases
where the principal’s preferred project is not implemented, a principal has two pos-
sible ways in which she might alter her actions to improve her final payoff. First, if
she continues to maintain control, the principal can increase effort to E = xP , thus
ensuring her preferred project is implemented. Second, if in case of delegation the
agent is informed, the principal could instead delegate control to the agent. In this
alternative case, the principal’s optimal subordinate effort is zero since the informed
agent will anyway implement his preferred project, regardless of the principal’s rec-
ommendation. As a naming convention, we define delegation regret as regret which
occurs in states where the principal would prefer to change her delegation decision.
In figure (A-3) we again partition the state space into cells that differ with regard to
the regret experienced by the principal. In cell (i), we continue to assume that no re-
gret is experienced if the principal is informed and can choose her preferred project.
If the principal remains uninformed, however, she experiences either loser regret or
delegation regret. In cell (ii), the agent remains uninformed even if the principal
delegates decision rights. In this case, the principal can improve her payoff by in-
creasing her own effort, and therefore she experiences loser regret. In cells (iii) and
(v), the principal remains uninformed and the agent is informed, such that project
2 is chosen. In these cases, the principal could have improved her payoff by either
keeping the decision right and increasing her own effort to xP , or by delegating the
39For example, if the principal keeps control, she does not update her beliefs about the effort the agent
would have put in she had delegated regardless of the effort observed from the agent in the subordinate role.
9
Principal as controlling party
(vi)
Delegation Regret
(v)
Delegation Regret
Px
 
(Receive P0) (ii)
Loser Regret
(Receive P0)(iv)
Loser Regret
(iii)
Loser Regret
   
(Receive P2)
Px
(Receive P0)(Receive P2)
E
(i)
No Regret
(Receive P1)
Axdee
Figure A-3: Principal as Controlling Party: For principals in the role of the controlling party, the state
space can be partitioned into six cells, which differ with regard to the regret experienced by the principal.
In cell (i), the principal experiences no regret because her preferred project is implemented. In cell (ii),
both the principal and the agent remain uninformed in both subgames. In the remaining cells, the principal
is uninformed but the agent is either informed, as in cells (iii) and (v), or would have been informed if
delegation had taken place, as in cells (iv) and (vi). In these cells, the principal either regrets his effort
choice and experiences loser regret or regrets his delegation choice and experiences delegation regret. This
depends on whether it is ex-post optimal to keep the decision right and increase effort to E = xP , as in cells
(iii) and (iv), or whether it is ex-post optimal to delegate the decision right to the agent and choose Ed = 0,
as in cells (v) and (vi). The cutoff between cells with loser regret and delegation regret if the agent would be
informed after delegation depend on whether P1 − gP (xP ) is greater or less than P2 − gP (0) and is defined
by xP ≡ g−1p (P1 − P2).
decision right to the informed agent and choosing zero effort herself. This will de-
pend on the profitability of these alternative strategies, i.e., on whether P1−gP (xP )
is greater or less than P2− gP (0). The threshold between these strategies is defined
by xP , where xP ≡ g−1p (P1 − P2). In cell (iii), P1 − gP (xP ) ≥ P2 − gP (0), such that
the principal prefers to keep the decision right and to increase effort. Therefore,
she experiences loser regret. In cell (v), P1 − gP (xP ) < P2 − gP (0), such that the
principal prefers to delegate the decision right and to choose zero effort. Therefore,
she experiences delegation regret.
Cells (iv) and (vi) differ from cells (iii) and (v) in that the agent is uninformed
as a subordinate and therefore project 0 is implemented. However, if the principal
delegates the decision right the agent is informed, and therefore project 2 is im-
plemented. Whether the principal prefers to increase her own effort or to delegate
the decision right to the agent and to choose zero effort herself will therefore again
depend on which of these two strategies is more profitable, i.e., whether P1−gP (xP )
is greater or less than P2−gP (0). In cell (iv), the principal prefers to raise her effort
and hence she experiences loser regret. In cell (vi), the principal prefers to delegate
the decision right and to choose zero effort, and hence she experiences delegation
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regret.40
Combining all cells, the utility of a principal in the role of the controlling party is
given by uP (E|xA, xP , eˆ, Ed) =
(A-14)
P1 − gP (E) if xP ≤ E
P0 − gP (E)− λLR[Pˆ1 − gP (xP ) + gP (E)] if xP > E & xA > eˆd
P0 − gP (E)− λLR[Pˆ1 − gP (xP ) + gP (E)] if xP ≥ xP > E & eˆ < xA ≤ eˆd
P2 − gP (E)− λLR[Pˆ1 − Pˆ2 − gP (xP ) + gP (E)] if xP ≥ xP > E & xA ≤ eˆ
P0 − gP (E)− λD[Pˆ2 + gP (E)] if xP > xP & xP > E & eˆ < xA ≤ eˆd
P2 − gP (E)− λD[gP (E)] if xP > xP & xP > E & xA ≤ eˆ
where λD is the principal’s degree of delegation regret.
As can be seen by comparing equations (A-2) and (A-14) as well as figures (A-
1) and (A-3), the principal’s utility is similar to that of the agent except that for
those realizations of xP and xA for which the principal would have preferred to
delegate rather than to have increased effort, loser regret is substituted by delegation
regret. Note that both forms of regret can be reduced by increasing E and therefore
affect the controlling party’s effort decision in similar ways. The following remark
summarizes the effects of delegation regret on effort:41
REMARK 1: In the effort stage of the authority-delegation game, a principal who
anticipates delegation regret and has held decision rights will over exert effort relative
to the best response of an individual who maximizes expected value.
Remark (1) shows that delegation regret has a positive effect on the principal’s
effort as a controlling party. As with loser regret, the principal attempts to avoid
states where he is uninformed in order to reduce the likelihood of regretting his
delegation decision.
Finally, we can turn attention to the case of a principal who delegated control.
In this subgame, a principal can potentially experience all three forms of regret:
loser regret, overrule regret and delegation regret. In figure (A-4) we again partition
the state space into cells that differ with regard to the regret experienced by the
principal.
In cell (i), the principal can implement her preferred project and therefore she does
not experience regret. In cell (ii), both the principal and the agent are uninformed.
As the principal could have been informed by increasing effort, she experiences loser
regret. In cells (iii) and (iv) the agent is informed and thus the agent implements
his preferred project. As the principal receives the agent’s preferred project, she
experiences either delegation regret or overrule regret depending on her ex-post op-
timal strategy. If xP ≤ xP = g−1p (P1 − P2), the principal’s ex-post optimal action
is to keep the decision right and choose E = max{Ed, xP }, where the “max” comes
from the assumption that the principal never expects to exert less effort with held
control rights than after delegation. If xP > xP , however, the principal’s ex-post op-
timal action is to continue to delegate and choose zero effort. Therefore, in cell (iii),
40Note that g−1p (P1 − P2) ≤ g−1P (P1 − P2 + gP (E)), i. e., xP ≤ τ(E). Hence, unlike the agent, the
principal will always experience either delegation regret or loser regret in case she remains uninformed. If
xP > 1, the principal never experiences delegation regret and always regrets not having invested more effort.
41The proof for this remark follows directly from the first order condition of the principal’s decision
problem and is omitted.
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Principal as subordinate party
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Figure A-4: Principal as Subordinate: For principals in the role of the subordinate party, the state
space can be partitioned into four cells, which differ with regard to the regret experienced by the principal.
In cell (i), a principal experiences no regret because only she is informed and therefore her preferred project
is implemented. In cell (ii), both parties remain uninformed and therefore the principal experiences loser
regret from not having chosen Ed = xP . In cells (iii) and (iv), the agent is informed and implements his
preferred project. In these cells, the principal either regrets delegating or regrets his effort choice. Which
regret force is felt depends on whether it is ex-post optimal to have kept the decision right and exerted
E = max{Ed, xP }, as in cell (iii), or to have delegated the decision right and exerted Ed = 0, as in cell
(iv). The cutoff between cells with delegation regret and overrule regret depend on whether P1 − gP (xP ) is
greater or less than P2 − gP (0) and is defined by xP ≡ g−1p (P1 − P2).
the principal experiences delegation regret and in cell (iv) the principal experiences
overrule regret.
Combing the cells into a single utility function, the utility of a principal in the
role of the subordinate is given by UdP (E
d|xA, xP , eˆd, E) =
(A-15)
=

P1 − gP (Ed) if xP ≤ Ed & xA > eˆd
P0 − gP (Ed)− λLR[Pˆ1 − gP (xP ) + gP (Ed)] if xP > Ed & xA > eˆd
P2 − gP (Ed)− λD[Pˆ1 − Pˆ2 − gP (max{Ed, xP }) + gP (Ed)] if xP ≤ xP & xA ≤ eˆd
P2 − gP (Ed)− λORgP (Ed) if xP > xP & xA ≤ eˆd
,
Comparing equations (A-15) and (A-11) as well as figures (A-2) and (A-4), it
can again be seen that overrule regret is substituted by delegation regret whenever
delegation regret is of larger magnitude than overrule regret. This implies that the
effort choice of the principal as a subordinate is increasing or decreasing relative
to the standard best response, depending on the strength of loser regret and the
combined strength of overrule and delegation regret.
REMARK 2: Principals in the subordinate role either experience delegation regret
or overrule regret when the controlling party is informed. Anticipation of both forms
of regret will decrease effort relative to those who do not. Individuals who anticipate
loser regret will increase effort relative to those who do not. As these forces move in
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different directions, heterogeneity in anticipatory regret may lead to observed effort
choices both above and below the best response.
We now turn attention to the effects of delegation regret on the delegation decision.
Delegation regret further reduces the utility of delegation since the principal will ex-
post experience delegation regret in a multitude of states. Delegation regret may
also reduce the utility in case of kept control, since the principal may also regret not
having delegated ex-post. However, as we explain below, it seems plausible that in
our experiment regret after delegation played a more important role.
A principal who delegates observes xP ex-post and thus knows with certainty
whether she would have had a better outcome had she kept decision rights. She also
directly experiences her recommendation being overruled, which may be particularly
salient. By contrast, the principal is never informed of xA. If a principal keeps
control and experiences the agent recommending the outside option (which indicates
that the agent is not informed) she does not know whether the agent would have
been informed if she had delegated. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that
the experience of delegation regret after the principal kept control is much less
salient than the delegation regret experienced after the principal delegated and was
informed. If this was the case, delegation regret is likely to have reduced the incentive
to delegate.42
42One way to account for these saliency differences in the model might be to allow for different degrees
of delegation regret λD in the delegation and in the no-delegation subgames. To avoid further notation,
however, we abstracted from this differentiation in this appendix.
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B. Session Overview
Table B-1: Session Overview
Date Treatment Subjects Matching Groups Periods
Main Treatments
May 2008 PLOW 30 3 10
May 2008 PLOW 30 3 10
May 20071 LOW 12 1 10
May 2007 LOW 30 3 10
May 2008 LOW 30 3 10
May 20071 HIGH 10 1 10
May 2007 HIGH 30 3 10
June 2007 HIGH 28 3 10
Oct 20082 HIGH 30 3 10
June 2007 PHIGH 30 3 10
May 2008 PHIGH 30 3 10
Control Treatments
Oct 2008 HIGH RAND 30 3 10
May 2009 HIGH RAND 30 3 10
May 2009 HIGH RAND 30 3 10
April 2011 PHIGH50 32 2 50
April 2011 PHIGH50 32 2 50
April 2011 HIGH NOREC 28 2 25
April 2011 PHIGH25 32 2 25
1 This session was split into two matching groups with different treatments.
2 This session did not use the strategy method for eliciting agent effort.
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C. Additional Tables
Table C-1: Average effort levels vs. Nash predictions across treatments
Controlling Party Subordinate
Principal Agent Agent Principal
E ENE ed ed
NE
e eNE Ed Ed
NE
PLOW 55.7 55 68.1 *** 45 22.8 25 16.5 *** 35
LOW 66.1 *** 55 68.3 *** 55 14.3 *** 25 16.2 ** 25
HIGH 48.2 * 45 58.7 *** 45 26.5 *** 35 19.6 *** 35
PHIGH 58.2 *** 45 65.1 ** 55 17.3 *** 35 20.7 25
Significance Levels for Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests against Nash predictions with data averaged by indi-
vidual prior to estimation. Significance Levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Table C-2: Overall profit of principals and agents by treatment
Principals Agents
Actuala Predictedb Actuala Predictedb
PLOW 18.23 20.1 22.35 25.6
LOW 18.40 20.1 16.32 17.3
HIGH 21.13 24.0 20.69 23.3
PHIGH 21.89 25.6 16.83 20.1
aActual earnings in treatment.
bPredicted earnings with Nash equilibrium effort and delegation.
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Table C-3: Delegation decisions by principals
(1) (2) (3a) (4b)
PLOW 0.035 0.061 0.106
(0.068) (0.073) (0.080)
HIGH 0.245*** 0.310*** 0.462***
(0.061) (0.097) (0.153)
PHIGH 0.326*** 0.356*** 0.503*** 0.003
(0.085) (0.118) (0.160) (0.144)
Belief if subordinate –0.003** –0.002 –0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Belief if controlling party 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
# of Lotteries Declined –0.062** –0.120**
(0.026) (0.052)
Period Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo. R2 .062 .112 .179 .176
Observations 1450 1450 750 300
Marginal effects of a probit regression. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust
standard error in parentheses, clustered by individual. a Regret aversion measures are available only for
sessions conducted in 2008-2011. b Column (4) includes data only from the HIGH and PHIGH treatments
for which we have regret aversion measures, and HIGH is the omitted category.
Table C-4: Average effort levels vs. average beliefs across treatments
Controlling Party Effort Subordinate Effort
Principal Agent Agent Principal
has control has control has control has control
E Eˆ ed eˆd e eˆ Ed Eˆd
PLOW 55.7 ** 64.8 68.1 ** 59.6 22.8 30.4 16.5 21.8
LOW 66.1 66.9 68.3 68.4 14.3 *** 27.5 16.2 * 20.9
HIGH 48.2 *** 59.0 58.7 56.2 26.5 ** 35.8 19.6 * 29.4
PHIGH 58.2 ** 69.3 65.1 62.3 17.3 ** 28.2 20.7 19.0
Significance levels calculated using a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test with beliefs and effort averaged by individual
prior to estimation. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. E is the principals’ average
effort with control. Eˆ is the agents’ average belief about principals’ effort with control. ed is the agents’
average effort with control. eˆd is the principals’ average belief about agents’ effort with control. e is the
agents’ average effort in the subordinate role. eˆ is the principals’ average belief about agents’ effort in the
subordinate role. Ed is the principals’ average effort in the subordinate role. Eˆd is the agents’ average belief
about principals’ effort in the subordinate role.
D. Loss Aversion and Effort
In discussing the effort provision of a loss averse individual, we made the intuitive
argument that loss aversion cannot explain the observed effort choices of the con-
trolling party. This appendix shows that a controlling party who is loss averse will
never choose effort which is above 60 but below 100. To simplify the equations, we
follow the theory section and express all effort choices in decimal form (i.e., an effort
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of 60 is expressed as .6).
Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that subjects have a utility func-
tion of the following form:
(D-1) v(x) =
{
x−R if x ≥ R
(1 + λ)(x−R) if x < R ,
where λ ≥ 0 denotes the degree of loss aversion and R denotes the reference point. A
natural reference point is R = 10, the value of project P0 in each experiment. Recall
that if subjects provide zero effort, they can always ensure a payoff of P0 = 10 by
choosing the known outside option. Also recall that eˆ is the belief of the principal
about the effort of the agent when she is the controlling party. We begin by proving
the following:
LEMMA 1: Let E∗(λ, eˆ) be a local maximum of the principal’s utility maximization
problem when she is the controlling party with loss aversion λ and beliefs eˆ. Then
E∗(λ, eˆ) is decreasing in loss aversion if E∗(0, eˆ) < .65.
PROOF:
If E < 0.65, the cost of effort is below 10. Given the parameters in the authority
game, this implies that losses relative to the reference point can only occur in the
case that both the controlling party and the subordinate remain uninformed. We use
this fact to circumvent non-differentiability around the reference point by restricting
analysis to this region. The optimization problem of the principal when she is the
controlling party is
max
E
U(E) = E(P1 −R− gP (E)) + (1− E)eˆ(P2 −R− gP (E))
− (1 + λ)(1− E)(1− eˆ)(P0 −R− gP (E)).
(D-2)
By assumption R = P0, which implies that the corresponding first order condition
is:
U ′(E) =(Pˆ1 − gP (E))− Eg′P (E)− eˆ(Pˆ2 − gP (E))− g
′
P (E)eˆ(1− E)−
(1 + λ)(1− eˆ)[(gP (E))− g′P (E)(1− E)] = 0.
(D-3)
Rearranging this equation and replacing g
′
P (E) and gP (E) and Pˆ1 with their values
which were constant across treatments yields:
(D-4) U ′(E) = −50E + 30− eˆPˆ2 + 50λ(1− eˆ)E
[
3
2
E − 1
]
= 0.
Writing D − 4 as an implicit function, the FOC is satisfied when:
(D-5) E =
30− eˆPˆ2
50
+ λ(1− eˆ)E
[
3
2
E − 1
]
.
The last term is negative for E ∈ [0, 23] and λ > 0. Thus, effort is decreasing in λ
for all E∗(0, eˆ) < .65 (our initial condition for the considered case).
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We now prove our main result:
PROPOSITION 4: Effort of a loss averse individual will never be above 60 but
below 100.
PROOF:
Equation D-4 can be rewritten as follows:
(D-6) U ′(E) = 75λ(1− eˆ)E2 − 50[1 + λ(1− eˆ)]E + 30− eˆPˆ2 = 0.
Note that this equation is quadratic and thus has two roots. Taking the second
derivative of U with respect to E we have:
(D-7) U ′′(E) = 150λ(1− eˆ)E − 50[1 + λ(1− eˆ)].
Thus, there is a unique inflection point at E = 13
1+λ(1−eˆ)
λ(1−eˆ) . The second derivative is
negative to the left of this reflection point and positive to the right of this inflection
point.
Solving the quadratic equation, E is a local maxima/minima at:
(D-8)
50[1 + λ(1− eˆ)]±√Z(λ)
150λ(1− eˆ) ,
where Z(λ) = 2500[1 + λ(1 − eˆ)]2 − 300λ(1 − eˆ)[30 − eˆPˆ2]. Also note that Z(λ) is
always greater than 0 so both roots exist. Comparing this to the inflection point,
the left root is the local maximum. Next, using L’Hoˆpital’s rule,
(D-9) E∗(0, eˆ) = lim
λ→0
50[1 + λ(1− eˆ)]−√Z(λ)
150λ(1− eˆ) =
[30− eˆPˆ2]
50
≤ .6
By lemma 1, it follows that this unique local maximum is decreasing in loss aversion.
As the unique local maximum is always below 60 and E ∈ [0, 100], it follows that
the global maxima are either below 60 or at the boundaries of E = 0 and E = 100.
E. Risk Aversion and Effort
In discussing the effort provision of a risk averse individual, we made an informal
argument as to why risk aversion and risk lovingness cannot account for the effort
provisions of the controlling party. This appendix provides numeric support for this
argument for the case of CRRA utility. To simplify the equations, we follow the
theory section and express all effort choices in decimal form (i.e., an effort of 60 is
expressed as .6).
Recall that a controlling principal with belief eˆ about the effort of the subordinate
and a concave utility function has an expected utility of
U(E) =Eu(P1 + w − gP (E)) + eˆ(1− E)u(P2 + w − gP (E))
+ (1− eˆ)(1− E)u(P0 + w − gP (E))
(E-1)
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where w is wealth, P1 = 40, P2 ∈ {35, 20}, P0 = 10, gP (E) = 25E2, and eˆ ∈
{0, .05, . . . , 1}. As can be seen by studying the arguments on the right hand side of
this equation, increasing effort has two effects. First, an increase in effort increases
the probability of winning the highest valued gamble which strictly increases utility.
Second, increasing effort decreases the utility earned for each of the three possible
outcomes. As this second effect necessarily depends on the marginal utility of three
separate points, it is easy to construct cases in which locally, effort is increasing
in risk aversion. Such local non-monotonicity makes analytic analysis both tedious
and unenlightening, particularly for extremely concave utility or those which do not
satisfy decreasing relative risk aversion.
As the decision problem of the controlling party is inherently discrete, we take a
more direct approach to determining the potential effect of risk aversion on effort.
Starting with common parameterized risk aversion utility functions such as CRRA
and CARA, we find the risk aversion parameters which maximize effort and then
compare these effort levels to the risk neutral baseline.
As with loss aversion, there is potential that an extremely risk averse controlling
party will choose an effort of 100 and ensure themselves P1. As a first step of the
analysis, we start by finding the lowest σ for which an individual with a CRRA
utility will choose an effort of 1. Let
E(σ, eˆ) =argmax
E
Eu(P1 + w − gP (E)) + eˆ(1− E)u(P2 + w − gP (E))
+ (1− eˆ)(1− E)u(P0 + w − gP (E))
(E-2)
be the optimal effort of an individual with CRRA utility of the form u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ
where w ≥ 16 so that utility is always well defined. Next, define σ1 to be the smallest
risk aversion parameter such that E(σ1, eˆ) = 1. It can be shown analytically that
E(σ, eˆ) = 1 for all σ > σ1 and thus that σ1 is a sufficient statistic for the parameter
space where full effort is predicted.
Our interest in risk aversion lies in being able to predict effort levels above the
risk neutral prediction but below an effort of 1. The next step of our analysis is to
look at the maximum possible effort which can be predicted for all σ ∈ [−∞, σ1).
Let
(E-3) σ∗(eˆ) = arg max
σ∈[−∞,σ1)
E(σ, eˆ)
and define E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) as the effort level which corresponds to σ∗(eˆ). For all initial
beliefs, we find E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) and compare this to E(0, eˆ), the effort predicted when
an individual is risk neutral.
Table E-1 reports σ∗(eˆ), σ1, as well as E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) and E(0, eˆ) for initial beliefs
eˆ in intervals of 10. As can be seen, σ∗(eˆ) < 0 for all initial beliefs revealing that
an individual who is slightly risk loving will provide the highest effort. As can be
seen in the last two columns of the table, however, the increase in effort for these
individuals is not large enough to alter the effort predictions.
As we typically are most interested in small amounts of risk aversion, it is useful
to also look at σ in the domain of [0, σ1). For all wealth and beliefs, it is the case
that effort is maximal in this domain when σ = 0.
Just as with loss aversion, effort provision under risk aversion has a difficult time
explaining effort levels above the risk neutral prediction. For all w ≥ 16, all beliefs
eˆ, and using both CRRA and CARA utility, it is never the case that E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ)−
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where w is wealth, P1 = 40, P2 ∈ {35, 20}, P0 = 10, gP (E) = 25E2, and eˆ ∈
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more direct approach to determining the potential effect of risk aversion on effort.
Starting with common parameterized risk aversion utility functions such as CRRA
and CARA, we find the risk aversion parameters which maximize effort and then
compare these effort levels to the risk neutral baseline.
As with loss aversion, there is potential that an extremely risk averse controlling
party will choose an effort of 100 and ensure themselves P1. As a first step of the
analysis, we start by finding the lowest σ for which an individual with a CRRA
utility will choose an effort of 1. Let
E(σ, eˆ) =argmax
E
Eu(P1 + w − gP (E)) + eˆ(1− E)u(P2 + w − gP (E))
+ (1− eˆ)(1− E)u(P0 + w − gP (E))
(E-2)
be the optimal effort of an individual with CRRA utility of the form u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ
where w ≥ 16 so that utility is always well defined. Next, define σ1 to be the smallest
risk aversion parameter such that E(σ1, eˆ) = 1. It can be shown analytically that
E(σ, eˆ) = 1 for all σ > σ1 and thus that σ1 is a sufficient statistic for the parameter
space where full effort is predicted.
Our interest in risk aversion lies in being able to predict effort levels above the
risk neutral prediction but below an effort of 1. The next step of our analysis is to
look at the maximum possible effort which can be predicted for all σ ∈ [−∞, σ1).
Let
(E-3) σ∗(eˆ) = arg max
σ∈[−∞,σ1)
E(σ, eˆ)
and define E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) as the effort level which corresponds to σ∗(eˆ). For all initial
beliefs, we find E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) and compare this to E(0, eˆ), the effort predicted when
an individual is risk neutral.
Table E-1 reports σ∗(eˆ), σ1, as well as E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ) and E(0, eˆ) for initial beliefs
eˆ in intervals of 10. As can be seen, σ∗(eˆ) < 0 for all initial beliefs revealing that
an individual who is slightly risk loving will provide the highest effort. As can be
seen in the last two columns of the table, however, the increase in effort for these
individuals is not large enough to alter the effort predictions.
As we typically are most interested in small amounts of risk aversion, it is useful
to also look at σ in the domain of [0, σ1). For all wealth and beliefs, it is the case
that effort is maximal in this domain when σ = 0.
Just as with loss aversion, effort provision under risk aversion has a difficult time
explaining effort levels above the risk neutral prediction. For all w ≥ 16, all beliefs
eˆ, and using both CRRA and CARA utility, it is never the case that E(σ∗(eˆ), eˆ)−
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Table E-1: Maximum effort predicted by risk aversion
Low Treatment HighTreatment
eˆ σ∗(eˆ) σ1 E(σ∗, eˆ) E(0, eˆ)
0 −0.7− 0.6 1.2 60 60
10 −0.3− 0.3 1.4 60 60
20 −1.3− 0.7 1.6 55 55
30 −0.9− 0.5 2.0 55 55
40 −2− 0.9 2.5 50 50
50 −1.8− 0.6 3.2 50 50
eˆ σ∗(eˆ) σ1 E(σ∗, eˆ) E(0, eˆ)
0 −0.7− 0.6 1.2 60 60
10 −.9− 0.7 1.6 55 55
20 −1.1− 0.7 2.2 50 50
30 −1.2− 0.8 2.9 45 45
40 −1.4− 0.9 3.8 40 40
50 −1.5− 1.3 5.0 35 35
E(0, eˆ) > 5. As 50 percent of our data lies 15 points above the risk neutral prediction,
we cannot rationalize the over-provision of effort by the controlling party with risk
preferences.
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